Exposure to the 2014 Gaza War and Support for Militancy: The Role of Emotion Dysregulation

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Abstract
How do wars shape emotions and attitudes in intractable conflicts? In two studies conducted in the aftermath of the 2014 Gaza War in the Middle East, we tested a new theoretical model wherein the ability to regulate emotions is central in determining the influence of war exposure on emotions (i.e., group-based humiliation) and support for militancy, through posttraumatic stress symptoms (PSS). Results supported our model: (a) higher exposure to the war predicted group-based humiliation in both studies and in Study 2 also greater support for militancy; in both studies, (b) higher exposure predicted more PSS only among participants high in emotion dysregulation, and, for them, (c) higher exposure predicted greater group-based humiliation, through increased levels of PSS. Results from Study 2 suggest that (d) group-based humiliation will ultimately lead to greater support for militancy. The findings’ contribution to the different literatures and their integration is discussed.

Keywords
intractable conflict, humiliation, exposure to terrorism and political violence, emotion regulation, stress.

Received July 22, 2017; revision accepted September 18, 2018

Promoting the resolution of intractable conflicts constitutes a major challenge currently facing humanity. In the second half of the 20th century, more than 41 million people were killed in political conflicts globally, and over the past decade, at least 40 countries have been involved in such conflicts (Leitenberg, 2006). Consequently, more civilians have been exposed to conflict-related violence than ever before. The 2014 Gaza War between Israelis and Palestinians is a prominent example of a major event in the context of an intractable conflict, with millions on both sides exposed to violence as part of it. Such intense exposure is known to increase support for militancy (Canetti, Hirsch-Hoefler, Rapaport, Lowe, & Muldoon, 2018) and war (Gvirsman et al., 2016) and promote a gradual shift toward more conservative, hawkish ideologies (Bonanno & Jost, 2006; Hersh, 2013; Hirsch-Hoefler, Canetti, Rapaport, & Hobfoll, 2016). These influences feed the conflicts, perpetuating a vicious cycle of violence by further diminishing support for peaceful resolutions (Bar-Tal, 2003). Understanding the mechanisms underlying this cycle may be crucial to identifying ways of breaking it.

Much of the psychological theory explaining cycles of violent escalation centers on cognitive processes. For example, a study of high-exposure survivors of the September 11 terrorist attacks observed a conservative shift among both Democrats and Republicans in the 18 months following the attacks. The authors’ explanation was that conservative ideology helps people cope with needs of uncertainty in times of threat (Bonanno & Jost, 2006). The changes brought on by these shifts can be long lasting, with Hersh (2013) recently showing a conservative shift among people close to the September 11 victims lasting more than a decade.

The protracted nature of intractable conflicts involves repeated exposure to political violence, directly or indirectly. In extreme cases, such exposure can lead to posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD; American Psychiatric Association, 2013), but even in the absence of a clear clinical diagnosis, high percentages of individuals in such societies suffer from some posttraumatic stress symptoms (PSS; Bleich, Gelkopf, & Solomon, 2003; Helpman, Besser, & Neria, 2015; Hobfoll, Canetti-Nisim, & Johnson, 2006). Importantly, several studies

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point to PSS as the main link between exposure to violence and support for aggression (Canetti et al., 2018; Canetti-Nisim, Halperin, Sharvit, & Hobfoll, 2009). Elaborating on these findings, Canetti, Hall, Rapaport, and Wayne (2013) proposed a stress-based model of political extremism. According to this model, personal exposure to political violence leads to PSS, ultimately predicting greater support for militancy through an increase in perceived threat. A study among Israelis and Palestinians in the occupied territories provided support for this model, demonstrating that personal exposure to political violence decreases support for compromises for peace (Hirsch-Hoefler et al., 2016). Although these studies illuminate the mechanisms through which cycles of violence are maintained, they fall short of exploring ways to break these cycles.

To overcome this shortcoming, it may be useful to shift from a purely cognitive perspective toward a more integrative perspective also addressing emotions. Indeed, in line with growing interest in affective processes in behavioral sciences (Lewis, Haviland-Jones, & Barrett, 2010), social and political psychologists have recently begun examining the role of emotions in political processes (see Halperin, 2016). Emotions are flexible response sequences called forth whenever individuals evaluate situations as offering important challenges or opportunities (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). The shift toward emotions is important first because emotions play a central role in shaping people's attitudes and behavior in conflict situations (e.g., Elison & Harter, 2007; Halperin, Russell, Dweck, & Gross, 2011; Halperin, Sharvit, & Gross, 2011; Pliskin, Bar-Tal, Sheppes, & Halperin, 2014). Specifically, intergroup conflicts often give rise to group-based emotions: emotions that individuals experience as a result of their group membership in response to situations perceived as relevant for the group (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). Second, in line with the definition above, emotions can be modified—an attribute that holds great potential for promoting intergroup conflict resolution (Halperin & Pliskin, 2015).

This latter point is crucial, as changes in emotion may be easier to induce than changes in long-term cognitions. Indeed, growing evidence suggests that even extremely powerful emotions can be modified through emotion regulation, meaning the processes that influence the experience and expression of emotions (Gross & Thompson, 2007). Relevant to the present project, the effective use of different strategies to regulate negative emotions in intractable conflicts leads to decreased support for aggression (e.g., Halperin & Gross, 2011; Halperin, Pliskin, Saguy, Liberman, & Gross, 2014; Halperin, Porat, Tamir, & Gross, 2013). Conversely, emotion dysregulation refers to maladaptive ways of responding to emotions (see Gratz & Roemer, 2004; Gratz & Tull, 2010). People high on emotion dysregulation may struggle to change emotional experiences, minimizing the potential benefits of emotion regulation in this context.

Emotion dysregulation is particularly relevant to the present investigation because of its importance in the development and maintenance of PSS following exposure to violence (see Seligowski, Lee, Bardeen, & Orcutt, 2015). More specifically, studies show that exposure to traumatic events predicts greater PSS only among those with decreased emotion regulation abilities (Bardeen, Kumpula, & Orcutt, 2013; Levy-Gigi et al., 2016). These findings correspond to Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) framework, in which stress reactions to negative events depend on interpersonal differences in emotion regulation abilities. Thus, studying how emotion regulation processes factor into the relationship between exposure and support for militancy, through PSS, could allow us to further illuminate the mechanism linking these two phenomena. Furthermore, understanding the role of emotion regulation may mean identifying the changeable features of this link, rather than viewing it deterministically.

Among the many powerful negative emotions individuals experience following repeated exposure to political violence, research has identified humiliation as playing a unique role in intractable conflicts (e.g., Ginges & Atran, 2008; Leidner, Castano, & Ginges, 2013; Longo, Canetti, & Hite-Rubin, 2014; Scheff, 1994). Humiliation is an extremely high-intensity self-conscious emotion that arises when one feels unjustly demeaned, devalued, or subjegated by another’s actions in a social context (e.g., Ginges & Atran, 2008; Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; Lindner, 2002). It involves two core appraisals: (a) internalization of the devaluated identity; and (b) viewing the cause of this devaluation as unjustly imposed by others (Fernández, Halperin, Gaviria, Agudo, & Saguy, 2018; Fernández, Saguy, & Halperin, 2015). These appraisals distinguish humiliation from other group-based emotions. When people reject a devaluation, they would likely feel anger rather than humiliation. Similarly, if people view this devaluation as fair, they would feel more ashamed than humiliated (Fernández et al., 2015).

We have several reasons to believe that humiliation, rather than related group-based emotions, plays a unique role in the current investigation. First, humiliation relates to loss of power in public contexts (e.g., Ginges & Atran, 2008), matching Jewish Israelis’ mind-set following the 2014 Gaza War, perceived as a failure in Israeli public discourse. Specifically, the revelation of Palestinian attack tunnels, showcasing military progress made by the Palestinians, surprised both the Israeli army and the public. Jewish Israelis thus struggled to deny their group’s devaluation, in line with Gilbert’s (1997) proposition that humiliation arises when one feels “stripped of one’s dignity, exposed and rendered vulnerable to attack.” Given this, we assume that Jewish Israelis were prone to feeling humiliated rather than angry.

Second, PSS is associated with negative emotions such as shame, anger, and humiliation (Giacaman, Abu-Rmeileh, Husseini, Saab, & Boyce, 2007). Unlike interpersonal traumatic exposure, however, when individuals experience PSS due to traumatic exposure to war, their threat is inherently imposed by the out-group and its behavior. Therefore, we assume that people perceived the devaluation of the group as unjustly imposed by others (i.e., the Palestinians), ultimately resulting in humiliation more than shame or anger.
In terms of outcomes, humiliation is associated not only with withdrawal tendencies, inaction, and helplessness (e.g., Ginges & Atran, 2008) but also with approach tendencies such as aggression (Elison & Harter, 2007). In the context of intergroup conflict, we suggest that humiliation would better correlate with approach tendencies, such as support for militancy, because the injustice appraisal, associated with approach tendencies, is highlighted in this context. This may be especially true in “honor societies” such as Israel, in which one’s perceived honor is given special importance (Guerra, Giner-Sorolla, & Vasiljevic, 2013). Accordingly, any threat to honor may increase humiliation and ultimately lead to an aggressive response (e.g., Levin, Roccas, Sidanius, & Pratto, 2015). Further support for a link between humiliation and aggression comes from Walker and Knauer’s (2011) conceptualization of violent behavior as an attempt to protect the self from further injury (i.e., humiliation) and restore a sense of self-worth and pride—the opposite of humiliation. Indeed, with very few exceptions (e.g., Ginges & Atran, 2008), studies show that humiliation is a particularly powerful motive for supporting violence (e.g., Saurette, 2006; Walker, 2006) in such societies (Coleman, Kugler, & Goldman, 2007; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). In sum, we propose a new theoretical model that incorporates emotional processes—specifically group-based humiliation and emotion dysregulation—into Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) stress-coping framework and Canetti-Nisim and colleagues’ (2009) stress-based model of political extremism. We hypothesize that (a) exposed individuals will experience greater group-based humiliation and express more support for militancy; (b) a positive relationship between exposure to war and PSS will appear only among individuals high in emotion dysregulation; and, for them, (c) higher exposure will lead to a stronger experience of group-based humiliation, through greater PSS. Finally, our full model suggests that (d) the experience of group-based humiliation will ultimately lead to increased support for militancy (see Figure 1).

To examine our hypotheses, we conducted two studies following a violent conflict-related event, namely, the 2014 Israeli–Palestinian Gaza War. In Study 1 (correlational), we examined the moderating effect of emotion dysregulation on the relationship between exposure to war and support for militancy, through PSS and group-based humiliation. Jewish-Israeli participants completed measures of exposure, emotion dysregulation, and PSS before being exposed to a humiliation-inducing stimulus and then reporting their group-based humiliation and support for militancy. In Study 2 (quasi-experimental), we sought to replicate the findings of Study 1. We sampled participants from two different Israeli regions, differing in exposure to political violence. We collected data in two separate waves to facilitate inferences about the impact of exposure, emotion dysregulation, and PSS on humiliation and support for militancy over time. We also added another measure of support for militancy, namely, tolerance for collateral damage (Reifen Tagar, Morgan, Halperin, & Skitka, 2014).

Study 1

In Study 1, we sought to provide initial support for our proposed model, establishing emotion dysregulation as a moderator of the link between exposure to political violence and support for militancy, through PSS. To this end, we turned to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, a prototypical example of an intractable conflict (Bar-Tal, 2001). With its frequent violent flare-ups, this conflict presents unfortunate opportunities for researchers interested in the psychological effects of exposure to political violence. The latest war in Gaza, known as 2014 Gaza War (Booth, 2014), serves as a backdrop for our research. The war took a very heavy toll on both societies involved in it, claiming 1,768 Palestinian and 67 Israeli lives and causing countless injuries and destruction of infrastructure (United Nations Relief and Works Agency, 2014). Much of the violence experienced by Israelis, the target population, came in the form of over 3,000 rockets fired from Gaza into Israel (The Israeli Security Agency, 2014), with civilians in the affected areas prompted by sirens to rush to bomb shelters. This repeated exposure to violence naturally had severe mental costs for both sides, resulting in high levels of PSS in nonclinical community samples (Besser, Zeigler-Hill, Weinberg, Pincus, & Neria, 2015).
A central threat to Israelis from Hamas came in the form of the organization’s construction of tunnels from Gaza into Israel for purposes of attack. This new threat took Israelis by surprise, with the Israeli government claiming that the offensive’s main goal was destroying the tunnels. Nonetheless, shortly after the war, Israelis learned that Hamas continued constructing tunnels, leading many of them to experience the war as a defeat (Tivon, 2015). The Gaza War thus provided an appropriate context for the current research and its focus on humiliation.

Method

Participants. A power analysis using G-power 3.0.10 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009), specifying two predictors and 1 degree of freedom in a multiple regression, with 0.85 power (Cohen, 1992) and a small effect size ($f = 0.10$), yielded a required sample size of 92. We recruited volunteers using snowball sampling, terminating data collection on the day we reached this target, yielding a sample of 121 Jewish participants. A power analysis using G-power 3.0.10 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009), specifying two predictors and 1 degree of freedom in a multiple regression, with 0.85 power (Cohen, 1992) and a small effect size ($f = 0.10$), yielded a required sample size of 92. We recruited volunteers using snowball sampling, terminating data collection on the day we reached this target, yielding a sample of 121 Jewish Israelis (93 women, ages 20-64, $M = 30.38$, $SD = 12.07$). The sample leaned left in terms of ideology, with 25.8% of respondents identifying as rightists, 32.5% as centrists, and 41.7% as leftists.

Procedure and measures. After giving their informed consent, participants reported levels of exposure to political violence, emotion dysregulation, and PSS. Next, they read a humiliation-inducing contrived news article, with content and images describing the threat caused by the cross-border tunnels dug by Hamas since the war. The article focused on Hamas’s continued tunnel-building efforts, representing Israeli defeat on the war’s official goal. The article featured quotes from Israeli leaders confirming the information and quotes of a Hamas leader mocking Israel’s loss in the war (see supplemental materials). Accordingly, the article served as a reminder of the Palestinians’ achievements and how these devalue Israel’s reputation and image—core appraisals of humiliation.

Following the humiliation-inducing stimulus, participants reported their levels of group-based emotions, including humiliation. Next, they reported their support for militancy toward the Palestinians and responded to several demographic questions. Finally, they were fully debriefed.

Exposure to political violence was measured using a 12-item questionnaire adapted from Canetti-Nisim and colleagues (2009; for example, “Did you experience the death of a family member or a close friend as a result of a terror attack?”). All responses were dichotomous ($1 = no$ and $2 = yes$). As one type of exposure does not necessitate or preclude any other type, internal reliability was not calculated. We coded the overall presence or absence of exposure in a binary manner, with those indicating at least one exposure event categorized as “exposed” (1), and others categorized as “nonexposed” (0).1

Emotion dysregulation was assessed using a shortened2 24-item version of the difficulties in emotion regulation scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004), known to have high internal reliability (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .93$) and correlate significantly and positively with other measures of emotion regulation, demonstrating its validity (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). We included four items from each of the scale’s domains, with criteria for removing items based on previously published factor analyses (see Gratz & Roemer, 2004), cultural adjustments, and the desire to avoid repetition. Items were rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (almost never) to 6 (always). Relevant items were reverse-coded (see Gratz & Roemer, 2004), and all items were then averaged to create a single DERS score (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .91$), with higher scores indicating greater emotion dysregulation.

PSS (Foa, Riggs, Dancu, & Rothbaum, 1993) were assessed by asking participants to report the frequency of each of 17 symptoms (e.g., “trying to avoid activities, situations, or places that remind you of the trauma”) in the preceding month on a 1 (not at all) to 4 (extremely frequent) scale. Foa and colleagues (1993) found the scale to have satisfactory internal consistency, high test-retest reliability, and good concurrent and convergent validity. We averaged all items to create a single PSS score (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .89$).

We asked participants to report their levels of various group-based emotions, including our target emotion, humiliation. The use of a longer list of emotions was intended to mask the study’s focus on humiliation.3 All items were rated on a 1 (not at all) to 6 (very much) scale.

Support for militancy was measured using four items based on Halperin and colleagues (2013), adapted for the present purpose. Participants stated their level of support for different militant actions (e.g., “a military attack in Gaza to reestablish Israel’s deterrence”) on a 1 (strongly opposed) to 6 (strongly support) scale. Support for militancy was calculated as the average of all items (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .79$).

Results and Discussion

About half of all participants reported having experienced at least one violent event.5 We examined differences between exposed and nonexposed participants, finding that participants exposed to violence reported higher levels of PSS ($M = 1.61$, $SD = .52$) than nonexposed participants, $M = 1.34$, $SD = .34$, $t(108.06) = -3.43$, $p < .01$, confidence interval (CI) = [-.43, -.11], Cohen’s $d = .61$. Nonetheless, we found no significant differences between the two groups in group-based humiliation—$t(118) = -.05$, $p = .962$—and support for militancy—$t(118) = -1.45$, $p = .152$—which may indicate the presence of important moderators.

Means, standard deviations, and bivariate zero-level correlations among the main variables are presented in Table 1. We found positive correlations between emotion dysregulation and both PSS and humiliation, as well as a positive association between humiliation and support for militancy.
It is important to note that ideology and several group-based emotions were also significantly correlated with humiliation and support for militancy, and we therefore controlled for them in the relevant analyses reported below. Importantly, all results remain essentially unchanged without making this adjustment.5

We then examined the first step of our hypothesized model, in which emotion dysregulation moderates the relationship between exposure to political violence and PSS, such that exposure leads to more PSS only among participants high in emotion dysregulation. To this end, we used Hayes’s (2013) PROCESS command (Model 1) to test the conditional effect of exposure on PSS, under different levels of emotion dysregulation. The analysis yielded two significant main effects, with both exposure ($B = .26, SE = .08, t = 3.44, p < .001; CI = [.11, .41]$) and emotion dysregulation ($B = .20, SE = .05, t = 3.67, p < .001; CI = [.09, .30]$) positively associated with PSS. We also found the hypothesized two-way interaction ($B = .29, SE = .11, t = 2.72, p < .01; CI = [.08, .50]$). Decomposition of the interaction revealed that among participants with low emotion dysregulation (i.e., at 1 SD below the mean), exposure to violence did not influence PSS ($B = .05, SE = .11, t = .50, p = .623; CI = [-.16, .26]$), whereas among participants with high emotion dysregulation (i.e., at 1 SD above the mean), exposure significantly predicted higher PSS ($B = .47, SE = .11, t = 4.34, p < .001; CI = [.25, .68]$).

To further test our hypothesized model, we next conducted a moderated mediation analysis. We used the PROCESS command with 5,000 iterations (Model 7) to test the conditional indirect effect of exposure to political violence (high vs. low) on humiliation through PSS, at different levels of emotion dysregulation, while adjusting for the other group-based emotions we measured. The analysis revealed a significant conditional indirect effect (index of moderated mediation $= .13, SE = .10; CI = [.002, .42]$). More specifically, we found that the indirect effect of exposure on humiliation through PSS was significant at high levels of emotion dysregulation ($B = .22, SE = .13, CI = [.02, .56]$), and the direct effect was not significant ($B = -.06, SE = .25, CI = [-.56, .43]$). Conversely, the indirect effect was nonsignificant at low levels of dysregulation ($B = .02, SE = .05, CI = [.07, .16]$).

Finally, to examine the full model, in which support for militancy is the ultimate outcome, we ran a path analysis, again adjusting for the other emotion items. To this end, we used AMOS 21 with maximum likelihood estimation. The model showed excellent fit to the data—$\chi^2(14) = 15.87, p = .321$; root mean square error approximation (RMSEA) = .034; normed fit index (NFI) = .98; comparative fit index (CFI) = .99; Tucker–Lewis index (TLI) = .99; standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) = .037; Figure 2 displays the standardized path coefficients. All paths of the latent factors were found to be statistically significant and in the
expected direction except for the path between humiliation and support for militancy ($\beta = .07, B = .06, p = .941$).

Study 1 thus provided initial support for most of our model, demonstrating that exposure to political violence within war shapes people’s emotions (i.e., humiliation) through PSS, but only among those high in emotion dysregulation. Nonetheless, it had several important limitations. First, the sample employed was relatively small given the multiple variables assessed in the model, which could partially explain why the final path in the model was nonsignificant, warranting replication using a larger, and thus more reliable, sample. Second, Study 1 employed a snowball sampling technique, which may introduce some dependence among observations, also threatening the findings’ external validity. Third, exposure was operationalized using self-reports rather than more objective measures, potentially producing measurement error. Fourth, we measured humiliation using only a single item, introducing noise into the measurement that could have been avoided with a multititem measure. Finally, the correlational nature of the current study limited our ability to derive causal conclusions. With these limitations in mind, we turned to conduct Study 2.

Study 2

The goal of Study 2 was to replicate Study 1 and overcome its limitations. As in Study 1, we took the 2014 Gaza War as our backdrop, but this study also differed from Study 1 in several important ways. First, we intentionally sampled participants from two areas in Israel differing in objective levels of exposure to political violence, but otherwise equivalent on various demographic characteristics, creating a quasi-experimental design. Second, we administered the study in two waves, facilitating a sequential analysis of effects to allow us to draw inferences about the effect of exposure, emotion dysregulation and PSS on humiliation and support for militancy over time. Finally, to better measure our dependent variable, we included an additional measure of support for militancy, focusing on tolerance for collateral damage (Reifen Tagar et al., 2014).

Method

Participants. We sampled participants from two areas in Israel, similar demographically (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010) but differentiated in levels of exposure to political violence, as indicated by their distance from the Gaza Strip (Snir, 2014). To elaborate, the high-exposure area included a very rare target for rockets. Conversely, the low-exposure area is located more than 40 km away from Gaza, making it a very frequent target of rocket fire. Conversely, the low-exposure area is located more than 40 km away from Gaza, making it a very rare target for rockets.

It is worth noting that identifying a low-exposure area was quite challenging, for several reasons. First, during the 2014 Gaza War larger parts of Israel entered the range of rockets fired from Gaza and were repeatedly targeted. Second, we had to consider previous meaningful exposure events, such as the 2006 Second Lebanon War, taking a major part of northern Israel out of consideration, from Haifa to the border. Indeed, in line with these limitations, we drew our low-exposure sample from the area around Hadera and Or Akiva, cities that are located not only north of the highly exposed center of Israel but also south of Haifa and the previously highly exposed north (see supplemental materials for further elaboration on sampling).

To ensure that the selected sampling areas indeed differed in level of exposure to rockets during the war, we turned to data collected by the “Red Alert” mobile app. This app provides real-time alerts for every rocket or mortar fired from Gaza into Israel (Snir, 2014). This app counted approximately 1,379 alerts in the high-exposure area during the war, compared with only five in the low-exposure area.

To determine sample size, we again used G-power 3.0.10 (Faul et al., 2009) with similar indications, but employing the effect size of the moderation from Study 1 ($f^2 = 0.02$). The calculation yielded a required sample size of 451 participants. However, we decided to over-sample by 20% due to expected dropout rates from the first wave (T1) to the second (T2). Accordingly, we recruited 554 Jewish-Israeli participants, including 275 from low-exposure areas and 279 from high-exposure areas (381 women, ages 18-72, $M = 37.22, SD = 12.65$), from the participant panels of two leading Israeli research firms, Midgam Project and iPanel, and participated in exchange for approximately US$5. These opt-in panels cover Israelis aged 18 years and older. T1 was conducted online in February 2016, during a period of relative calm, and included measures of self-reported exposure, emotion dysregulation, and PSS. Of all T1 participants, 440 (222 from low-exposure areas and 218 from high-exposure areas; 294 women, ages 18-72, $M = 37.18, SD = 12.66$) completed the T2 measures 1 week later (T2), yielding an 80% completion rate. Importantly, we found no dropout bias: None of the variables we examined (gender, ideology, religiosity, age, or exposure area) significantly predicted dropout (all $ps > .05$), and together they accounted for only 1% of the variance of attrition. Ideologically, the final sample was quite similar to the distribution of political ideology in Israeli society, with 55.5% of the participants identifying themselves as moderately to extremely rightist, 26.4% as centrist, and 18.1% as moderately to extremely leftist.

To examine whether the exposure samples (high vs. low) matched on key variables (ideology, level of religiosity, age, and gender), we ran a series of independent samples $t$-tests. The samples did not differ in gender distribution, $\chi^2 (1) = .55, p = .463$, but compared with the low-exposure sample, the high-exposure sample was more rightist, $M = 3.58, SD = 1.36$ versus $M = 3.11, SD = 1.39$, respectively, $t(438) = 3.56, p < .001$; more religious, $M = 3.25, SD = 1.36$ versus $M = 2.58, SD = 1.13$, respectively, $t(438) = -5.67, p < .001$;
and younger, $M = 34.41, SD = 11.64$ versus $M = 38.89, SD = 13.06$, respectively, $t(438) = 4.64, p < .001$. Due to these unintended differences, we adjusted for participants’ ideology, level of religiosity, and age in all analyses below. Also, as in Study 1, several group-based emotions were significantly correlated with humiliation and with support for militancy, and we therefore again adjusted for them in the relevant analyses reported below. Nonetheless, all results remain essentially unchanged when not adjusting for these variables (see supplemental materials).

**Procedure and measures.** Participants completed an online questionnaire that was nearly identical to our Study 1 design, with several exceptions. First, we created a longitudinal design by sampling in two waves with a 1-week interval. In T1, participants completed the independent variables, DERS (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .92$) and PSS (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .92$) measures. Furthermore, we used participants’ actual location (i.e., their distance from the Gaza Strip) as the operationalization of exposure, with self-reported level of exposure, measured as in Study 1, serving as a manipulation check. In T2, participants read a humiliation-inducing contrived news report. We created a similar, but not identical, text to the one used in Study 1, so as to ensure that any effects found are not a product of the specific wording or images while also adapting the content to the later time in which we ran the study.

The article emphasized Hamas’s expansion of attack tunnels, as well as insufficient investment by the Israeli defense establishments in a proper defensive fence. The article also quoted Israeli leaders’ assessments of the state of the tunnels (i.e., “it is likely to assume that the number of attack tunnels that cross the border is already approaching the number we witnessed in the beginning of 2014 Gaza War”). As in Study 1 and for the same reasons, we expected this article to serve as a humiliation-inducing stimulus.

Second, to address one of Study 1’s methodological limitations, we measured humiliation using three items (i.e., humiliation, insult, and helplessness) rated on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 6 (very much) and averaged to create a single humiliation score (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .94$). The inclusion of more items allowed us to reduce any potential noise created by the reliance on a single item, to distinguish humiliation from other group-based negative emotions and to calculate reliability, thus increasing construct validity. Finally, we added an additional measure of support for militancy, focusing on tolerance for collateral damage. Participants read a scenario (see Reifen Tagar et al., 2014), describing an incident in which Israeli soldiers wounded dozens of Palestinians and killed five during an East Jerusalem protest. Among the victims were uninvolved civilians, including an 11-year-old child and two women. Participants were asked to rate their agreement with four items measuring their tolerance for collateral damage, on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 6 (very much) (e.g., “If such an event happens again, I think Israel should avoid firing live ammunition at protesters”;

Cronbach’s $\alpha = .86$). Finally, as in Study 1, participants reported their support for militancy (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .78$). Upon completing the questionnaire, they were fully debriefed.

**Results and Discussion**

We first examined our manipulation check, finding exposure to political violence (T1), to be high overall, with 67.5% of all participants reporting having experienced at least one violent event. Consistent with our sampling goals, high-exposure participants reported greater exposure to political violence ($M = .85, SD = .35$) than low-exposure participants, $M = .50, SD = .50; t(438) = −8.52, p < .001$, Cohen’s $d = .81$. We then turned to examine the effect of exposure on the other variables in our model. As expected, participants in high-exposure areas reported more PSS in T1 ($M = 1.74, SD = .58$) than those in the low-exposure areas, $M = 1.42, SD = .48; t(438) = −6.54, p < .001$, CI = [−.42, −.23], Cohen’s $d = .60$. Analyses also revealed that high-exposure participants (compared with low-exposure participants) reported higher levels of humiliation, $M = 3.09, SD = 1.47$ versus $M = 2.82, SD = 1.38$, respectively, $t(437) = −2.01, p = .045$, CI = [−.54, −.06]; greater support for militancy, $M = 3.96, SD = 1.18$ versus $M = 3.71, SD = 1.26$, respectively, $t(438) = −2.12, p < .035$, CI = [−.47, −.01], Cohen’s $d = .20$; and greater tolerance for collateral damage, $M = 3.42, SD = 1.25$ versus $M = 3.08, SD = 1.3$, respectively, $t(438) = −2.77, p < .001$, CI = [−.57, −.10], Cohen’s $d = .26$, all measured in T2.

Means, standard deviations, and bivariate zero-level correlations among our research variables are presented in Table 2. Emotion dysregulation (T1) was significantly correlated with almost all other variables, showing strong and highly significant positive correlations with PSS (T1) and with all dependent variables measured in T2 (i.e., humiliation, support for militancy, and tolerance for collateral damage). Furthermore, and in line with our research model, we found positive associations between PSS (T1) and humiliation (T2) and between humiliation and both measures of support for militancy (T2).

We then turned to examine our model, starting with the interactive effect of exposure to political violence (high vs. low) and emotion dysregulation on PSS. Employing the same PROCESS procedure used in Study 1—Model 1; $R^2 = .57$, $F(6, 433) = 35.25, p < .001$—we found significant main effects for both exposure ($B = .22, SE = .05$, $t = 4.75, p < .001$, CI = [.13, .30]) and emotion dysregulation ($B = .33, SE = .03, t = 11.35, p < .001$, CI = [.27, .38]), as well as the Hypothesized Exposed Exposure × Emotion Dysregulation interaction ($B = .17, SE = .06, t = 3.02, p > .001$, CI = [.06, .28]) (see Figure 3). Decomposition of the interaction revealed that among participants low in emotion dysregulation, exposure had no effect on PSS ($B = .08, SE = .06, t = 1.31, p = .194$, CI = [−.04, .21]), whereas for those high in emotion dysregulation, exposure significantly predicted more PSS ($B = .35, SE = .06, t = 5.49, p < .001$, CI = [.22, .47]).
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations Between Research Variables in Study 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Exposure to political violence (1 = low; 2 = high)</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Emotion dysregulation</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. PSS</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.52**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Humiliation (T2)</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>.10**</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Support for militancy (T2)</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>.10*</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Support for collateral damage</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.68**</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. PSS = posttraumatic stress symptoms.
*p < .05. **p < .01.

Figure 3. The interactive effect of exposure to political violence and emotion dysregulation on PSS in Study 2.
Note. PSS = posttraumatic stress symptoms.

A subsequent moderated mediation analysis, adjusting for the other group-based emotions measured, as in Study 1, indicated a significant conditional indirect effect (index of moderated mediation = .05, SE = .03; CI = [.003, .13]). More specifically, the analysis revealed that the indirect effect of exposure (high vs. low) on humiliation through PSS was significant only at high levels of emotion dysregulation (effect = .11, SE = .04, CI = [.04, .23]), with the direct effect turning nonsignificant in this model (B = .03, SE = .12, CI = [−.21, .28]). The indirect effect at low levels of dysregulation was nonsignificant (B = .03, SE = .02, CI = [−.06, .10]).

Finally, to test our full hypothesized model, we again employed a path analysis adjusting for the other group-based emotions, as in Study 1. The model in which exposure predicts humiliation and consequent support for militancy, through PSS only for those high in emotion dysregulation yielded good fit—χ²(9) = 18.596, p = .012; RMSEA = .023; NFI = .98; TLI = .92; CFI = .99; SRMR = .0132. All paths of the latent factors were statistically significant. High-exposure participants showed higher level of PSS, but only among those high in emotion dysregulation. For them, PSS predicted higher group-based humiliation (T2), which in turn was associated with greater support for militancy (T2) (see Figure 4 for standardized path coefficients). Next, we tested a similar model indicating tolerance for collateral damage as the ultimate variable. This model also fit the data well—χ²(9) = 18.33, p < .05; RMSEA = .05; NFI = .99; TLI = .977; CFI = .995; SRMR = .0116—and yielded similar results, with a significant path between group-based humiliation and support for collateral damage (β = .09, B = .08, SE = .04, p < .05).

Study 2’s findings thus replicated those of Study 1 and extended them in several important ways. First, our independent variable was an objective operationalization of exposure, rather than self-report. Next, Study 2 employed a longitudinal design, with the independent variables measured a week before the dependent variables. Within such a design, it is more likely to assume that the variables measured in the first wave accounted for variability in those measured a week after, rather than vice versa. Thus, although we cannot confidently make causality claims, we can cautiously suggest that our data gives an indication of causality. Another contribution of the longitudinal design lies in the benefit of separating the exposure measures from the contrived humiliation-inducing text to which participants responded in T2. The week-long time-gap between the two measures minimizes the chance that participants would draw a connection between them, thus avoiding demand characteristics. Finally, these findings offer support for the full model we proposed, with our analyses yielding a significant relationship with militancy, measured in two different ways, as the ultimate outcome of the model. Overall, Study 2 lends additional support to our prediction that emotion dysregulation is the key psychological variable moderating people’s emotions and consequent policy support in the wake of exposure to political violence.

General Discussion

The present research set out to examine the process by which exposure to violence leads to support for more violence, creating a vicious cycle of violent escalation. To this end, we proposed an extension to the existing stress-coping framework (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012) and the stress-based model of political extremism (Canetti et al., 2013), with the influence of exposure to political violence on PSS, and indirectly on emotions and support for militancy, moderated by emotion dysregulation.
We tested this model in two studies conducted among Jewish Israelis in the wake of the 2014 Gaza War. Study 1 revealed no direct relationship between degree of personal exposure to the 2014 Israel-Gaza War and humiliation or support for militancy, suggesting that some moderators may be involved. Indeed, results indicated significant moderation by emotion dysregulation, with exposure to political violence associated with PSS only for participants with high emotion dysregulation. We also found a significant conditional indirect effect, such that exposure led to group-based humiliation through the mediation of PSS, but only for those high on emotion dysregulation. It is worth mentioning that of all discrete emotions measured in the current investigation, PSS predicted only humiliation.

Study 2 replicated and extended Study 1’s findings using a unique two-wave field design, comparing people from areas exposed repeatedly to rocket barrage during the war to people from low-exposure areas. This design provided more compelling evidence for our proposed model. As in Study 1, high exposure predicted greater PSS only for people high on emotion dysregulation, and PSS predicted more group-based humiliation among this group. Furthermore, Study 2’s findings supported our full model, in which group-based humiliation results in more militancy, as measured by support for militancy and tolerance for collateral damage. We believe humiliation plays a unique role in this process, as supported by our findings that it was the only emotion, across both studies, to consistently relate to both PSS and militancy. These findings lend support to our research model, suggesting that exposure to political violence predicts support for militancy in the context of intractable conflicts mainly when people have difficulties regulating their emotions.

The present research offers several important theoretical contributions to the literatures on exposure to political violence and emotion regulation abilities (for an exception, see Levy-Gigi et al., 2016) or connecting these to support for militancy. The current work is the first to present a holistic model that takes into account the influence of individual differences in reactions to exposure to war (i.e., PSS and emotion dysregulation) and connects these to intergroup emotions (humiliation) and political attitudes (support for militancy). Because we find that emotion dysregulation has important implications for understanding support for militancy following exposure to violence, future research should try to further integrate these two fields of research.

The present research also has applied implications, relevant for the development of possible interventions to reduce negative emotions and support for militancy in the context of intractable conflicts. Our findings indicate that emotion dysregulation is crucial to the emergence of PSS as well as to support for conflict-supporting militant positions in light of group-based humiliation. This understanding may hold the key for intervention design, as Halperin and his colleagues (2013) have demonstrated that emotion regulation, even in the context of intractable conflict, can be taught and trained. Specifically, the authors showed that training people in cognitive reappraisal, a form of emotion regulation, decreases support for militancy toward the adversary in an intractable conflict. Thus, training people to better regulate emotions can potentially decrease levels of PSS in the wake of exposure to political violence, thereby reducing...
individuals’ support for militancy. The indirect approach to emotion regulation interventions (Halperin, Cohen-Chen, & Goldenberg, 2014) may be particularly beneficial for reducing militant policy support in these charged contexts, in which individuals may not be open to direct attempts to persuade them to change their intergroup emotions and attitudes (Bar-Tal & Rosen, 2009). 

Alongside its contributions, the current study has several limitations. First, we focused on the more powerful party in an intractable conflict. As power is known to influence various psychological processes in intergroup conflict (e.g., Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009), the potential effects on low-power parties to such conflicts need to be tested as well. Second, in the current study we measured emotion dysregulation as a whole, addressing high versus low emotion regulation abilities. Future research should expand on our approach by (a) considering different types of emotion dysregulation (e.g., lack of emotional clarity, nonacceptance of negative emotions) and (b) determining whether high dysregulation in light of exposure to war reflects a general inability to regulate emotions or rather the use of ineffective strategies to do so (e.g., suppression). Therefore, we suggest that future research should (a) integrate other measures of emotion regulation, so as to increase construct validity, or even focus on different subscales of the DERS measure; and (b) manipulate emotion regulation rather than rely on self-reported individual differences.

More specifically, future research could address this limitation by comparing people trained to effectively regulate emotions to untrained counterparts. If future research could demonstrate that training people to effectively regulate their emotions has a significant role in the exposure-militancy link, it will be highly useful for interventions for exposed individuals in an interpersonal and intergroup level—to the benefit of both individual mental health and the trajectory of stopping vicious cycles of violence. This line of research can deepen our understanding of the exact mechanisms by which emotion regulation influences the exposure-militancy link. Also, it may shed light on the potential for emotion regulation interventions as well as the causal role-played by emotions regulation within the model we propose, increasing our findings’ internal validity. Another, related line of possible future research would be to consider the possibility that emotion regulation abilities may be shaped by exposure to war.

In conclusion, the present research suggests that it is not mere exposure to political violence that leads to support for militancy in intergroup conflict, fueling the vicious cycle of violence. Instead, we find that one’s ability to deal with the intense emotional experiences that result from this exposure plays a crucial role, such that the exposure-militancy link emerges only when this ability is limited. Our model offers a first step toward understanding the role of emotional processes in the mechanisms driving these violence cycles. Specifically, it sheds light on the unique role of emotion dysregulation in the maintenance of these cycles, by facilitating in the emergence of PSS and negative emotions, which foster support for militancy toward the out-group. We believe that this line of research can potentially suggest an effective way to terminate cycles of violence, making an important contribution to the task of promoting the resolution of intractable conflicts and the mental health of individuals involved in them.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by a European Research Council grant (335607) to the last author and the National Institute of Mental Health grant (R01 MH073687) to the third author.

Notes
1. This decision stemmed from two considerations. First, we believe the significance of exposure does not vary linearly with the amount of exposure, such that the weight of experiencing three violent events does not necessarily correspond to 3 times the weight of experiencing one event. Hence, for our purposes, it was not informative to treat exposure as a continuous variable. Second, we believe that there are inherent differences between exposed versus nonexposed individuals, regardless of the amount or the variety of types of exposure an exposed person has experienced, which is best reflected in a dichotomous approach.
2. For the full list of items see supplemental materials.
3. See in the supplemental materials for the full list of emotions.
4. For the full distribution of “yes” responses for all exposure items see supplemental materials.
5. The emotions used as covariates were all discrete emotions measured in the study (except for humiliation). Analyses not adjusting for these variables are reported in the supplemental materials.
6. Please note that we choose to use AMOS 21 to test the full model. This is because Hayes’s (2013) macro cannot facilitate testing the full model, in which the dependent variable (i.e., humiliation) predicts another outcome variable (i.e., support for militancy). We derive this strategy from recent work by Shuman, Cohen-Chen, Hirsch-Hoefer, and Halperin (2016).
7. We chose these fit indices based on Schreiber, Nora, Stage, Barlow, and King (2006). Their review states the reported fit indices as common and well-known for structural equation samples.
8. Humiliation, but not any other group-based emotion measured, was uniquely predicted by posttraumatic stress symptoms (PSS).
9. Although not every alert implies an actual hit and many were false alarms, we believe the figures provide a good indication for the difference in exposure between our two target areas.
10. The emotions used as covariates were all measured emotion items (except for the items included in the humiliation scale). Analyses not adjusting for these variables are reported in the supplemental materials.
11. The emotions used as covariates were all measured emotion items (except for the items included in the humiliation scale).
Analyses not adjusting for these variables are reported in the supplemental materials.

12. Note that in the current study, the zero-order correlation between shame and humiliation was very high, suggesting that they might represent overlapping constructs. Thus, we analyzed the two discrete emotions as competing factors in the same path analysis. In this analysis, the path between shame and militancy was nonsignificant (see supplemental materials for the full analysis), while all other paths remained significant,suggesting that humiliation is uniquely associated with militancy.

13. See in the supplemental materials for the zero-level correlations among the other group-based emotions measured.

14. The χ² test for goodness of fit was significant, which can imply poor fit of the model to the data. However, a more plausible reason in this case is the large sample (N > 200) we used in Study 2, which brought the χ² value to significance, regardless of the goodness of fit to the data.

15. The analysis shows that like humiliation, fear is also an outcome of PSS. Nonetheless, only humiliation significantly predicts militancy.

**Supplemental Material**

Supplemental material is available online with this article.

**References**


Schreiber, J. B., Nora, A., Stage, F. K., Barlow, E. A., & King, J. (2006). Reporting structural equation modeling and con-


