Recent years have seen researchers making initial steps towards drawing on insights from emotion research in the study of intractable intergroup conflicts, but the knowledge on emotion and emotion regulation cannot simply be implanted “as is” into the study of these unique contexts. The present article begins with a discussion of the unique context of intractable conflicts and continues with an examination of the existing knowledge on emotion and emotion regulation in these conflicts. From there it proceeds to detail the contextual factors unique to intractable conflict that must be taken into account when studying these constructs, focusing on three such factors: long-term emotional sentiments, entrenched conflict-supporting ideology, and clinical factors related to the repeated exposure to violence associated with life in conflict. For each factor, the article examines existing theories and empirical knowledge on its influence over the type and magnitude of emotion experienced, the behavioral and political outcome of emotional experiences, and on emotion regulation processes. When existing theory and knowledge are limited, we present theory and propose directions for future research. Finally, the article discusses the challenges facing those wishing to integrate conflict studies and emotion research and benefit fully, theoretically, empirically, and on the applied level from such an interdisciplinary integration.

KEY WORDS: emotion, emotion regulation, intergroup conflict, sentiments, ideology, trauma
hailed by some as an “affective revolution” in the study of human behavior (Lewis, Haviland-Jones, & Barrett, 2010), and “affective science” has recently emerged as a field of research in the wake of such calls (Gross & Barrett, 2013). Psychologists, neuroscientists, philosophers, computer scientists, sociologists, economists, and anthropologists all study different aspects of what they define as emotional processes. As parts of this so-called revolution, scholars have expanded emotion theories, studied a wider set of emotions, and formulated more accurate and validated measurements (Mauss & Robinson, 2009). In addition to the many obvious advantages of this revolution, it has also made the study of emotions more accessible to other disciplines, and today emotions are becoming more and more common in disciplines such as political science (e.g., Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000), sociology (Scheff, 2003), anthropology (Beatty, 2013), law (Maroney & Gross, 2013), and philosophy (Griffiths, 2013).

But why should political psychologists and conflict resolution scholars study emotions? Because they’re both powerful and changeable, and thus their power may play an influential role in sustaining as well as resolving intergroup conflict. However, when examining the role of emotions in human behavior in political and intergroup contexts, the existing knowledge on emotions cannot simply be implanted “as is” into such specific domains. Social scientists dating back to Kurt Lewin (1951) have proposed that human behavior is a function of the environment in which the person operates with its physical and social factors. In Lewin’s (1951) view, any behavioral analysis must begin with an understanding of the situation as a whole. Just as the study of a social context is essential for understanding psychological and physical phenomena in a particular society (e.g., Giddens, 1984; Parsons, 1951), context also has specific bearing on emotional processes.

Accordingly, in the current article we would like to suggest that when political psychologists and conflict resolution scholars study emotions, they should acknowledge the unique characteristics of the political reality and the various ways in which these characteristics influence the psychology of the individuals involved in it. Consequently, they should study emotions and emotion regulation processes differently than do more traditional affective scientists. In other words, although we believe it is important to acknowledge the basic tenants of fundamental research on emotions and emotion regulation, acknowledging the general truths and definitions of the concept, we also believe there are limits to these general truths. Researchers must therefore adopt these principles while also formulating their research so that it acknowledges the unique context, modifying it when necessary to allow for a substantial examination of emotional processes within this context.

The caveat above holds especially true in examining unique types of social phenomena, such as intense, prolonged, and violent intergroup conflicts. This is due to the many ways in which the physical and psychological consequences of such realities shape the emotional experiences of the individuals living within them. We thus begin with the description of the unique context of intractable intergroup conflict, a type of conflict that is vicious and difficult to resolve. Such conflicts are especially resistant to peaceful resolution (Coleman, 2000; Kriesberg, 1993) and therefore constitute a unique occurrence of intergroup conflict.

A major attribute of intractable conflict is its protracted and durable nature. Thus, this context greatly impacts the well-being of society members—it involves them, occupies a central position in public discourse and the public agenda, and creates information and experiences that compel society members to construct a suitable worldview. Moreover, it is a determinative factor in the selection of lines of behaviors, continuously shaping the lives of the involved societies and imprinting every aspect of individual and collective life (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2013). While these conflicts erupt due to conflicting goals over real issues, the fact that in their essence they are accompanied by sociopsychological dynamics influences their nature and requires thorough consideration of these factors (see Bar-Tal, 2013; Fitzduff & Stout, 2006; Kelman, 2007). The central role played by psychological processes in these conflicts, together with their grave physical consequences, likely has
a far-reaching influence on the emotional processes experienced by the individuals involved in these contexts.

In light of the above, in the following article, we will first examine the significance of emotions in the context of intractable conflicts, focusing on both theoretical aspects and the accumulated empirical knowledge. We will then examine processes of emotion regulation in intractable conflicts, which we believe offer a new avenue for promoting conflict resolution. From there, we will continue to discuss the importance of examining emotions in their relevant context and acknowledging the unique features and consequences of that context. More specifically, we will examine three contextual factors highly relevant to the realm of intractable conflicts: long-term emotional sentiments, ideology, and clinical factors resulting from repeated exposure to violence. For each of these factors, we will examine how it may be implicated in the experience of emotions, in the results of emotions, and in emotion regulation processes. We will conclude with an examination of other relevant factors that warrant investigation, a discussion of theoretical and applied implications, and suggestions for future research.

**Emotions in Intractable Conflicts**

Even though the study of emotions has grown rapidly (Lewis et al., 2010), scholars do not yet agree on a single definition of emotions, with differences pertaining mostly to the boundaries of the concept and its phenomena (e.g., emotional words, emotional experience, emotional expressions, or emotional behavior; see Frijda, 2004). The number of scientific definitions proposed has grown so rapidly that counting seems rather hopeless (Kleinginna and Kleinginna already reviewed more than 100 in 1981).

In this article, we adopt William James’s (1884) classical perspective on emotions as flexible response sequences (Frijda, 1986) that are called forth whenever an individual evaluates a situation as offering important challenges or opportunities (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). According to this definition, emotions transform a stimulus into a motivation to respond to it in a particular manner (Zajonc, 1998). This fits nicely with Averill’s (1990) notion of emotions as stories that guide and then justify people’s reactions to specific events. The main role of the emotional story is thus to direct and prepare people to adaptively respond to the emotion-eliciting stimulus. For example, anger may transform a stimulus (e.g., a violent act by another person) into a reaction (e.g., the desire to retaliate) through the emotional goal of correcting the aggressor’s perceived wrongdoing. Fear, on the other hand, may transform the same stimulus into a different reaction (e.g., avoidance of any contact with the aggressor) through the emotional goal of minimizing the experienced threat. As we see it, emotions do this by encapsulating various perceptual, sensory, physiological, and motivational dynamics and directing them towards the important mission of developing a proper response to a status-quo breaking event. In most cases, when the emotion-eliciting event is absorbed and appraised by the sensory and perceptual systems, it is compared to one’s well-established emotional stories or schemes and rather quickly produces emotional goals and action tendencies.

But emotional experiences and their motivational, attitudinal, and behavioral implications go far beyond the intra- and even the interpersonal context. There is wide consensus today that emotions are driven by intra- and intergroup dynamics, are often expressed within social contexts, and in themselves influence the nature of intra- and intergroup relations. Most relevant to the present discussion is the concept of group-based emotions, which refers to emotions that are felt by individuals as a result of their membership in or identification with a certain group or society (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). Empirical research has demonstrated that individuals may experience emotions not only in response to personally relevant life events and activities, but also in response to events that affect other members of a group with which they identify (e.g., Mackie et al., 2000; Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordin, 2003). Even though the
emotion-provoking event is not personally experienced, group-based emotions themselves are personal experiences, and they can be targeted at events, individuals, or social groups. In the later case, they are defined as intergroup emotions: Emotions that are felt as a result of the felt belongingness to a certain group, and targeted at another group (Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). Like many other psychological phenomena, group-based and intergroup emotions are best understood using examples. Throughout this section, we will refer to anger, hatred, fear, hope, and empathy to illustrate the nature and importance of group-based emotions in the context of intractable conflicts.

But first, it is important to understand why it is that emotions have the ability to influence public opinion and even action in the context of intractable conflict. We (Halperin, Sharvit, & Gross, 2011) have presented a comprehensive appraisal-based framework for understanding the influence of emotions over conflict-related beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. The most basic element in this proposed framework (see Figure 1) describes a sequence of psychological processes beginning with exposure to the emotion-provoking stimulus, which may be real or remembered information pertaining to the intergroup context. For example, an individual may hear on the news that a member of her group has been hurt by a rocket launched by the outgroup. This exposure results in individual cognitive appraisal of the stimulus, and depending on the specific ways in which the information or events are appraised (appraisals may relate to significance, pleasantness, certainty, perceived obstacles, responsibility attribution, and controllability, among other dimensions of the stimulus at hand), the appraisal results in the experience of a discrete emotional reaction. We will elaborate on such specific appraisals below, but as a brief illustration, if the individual appraises the outgroup’s action as unprovoked and the ingroup as strong, she may respond with anger; if she believes the action stemmed from the fundamental evil nature of the outgroup and its members, she may react with hatred; and if she believes she is also at risk of being hurt by a rocket and her controllability over the situation is limited, her reaction might be one of fear. Each emotion, in turn, is associated with specific emotional goals (as we will detail below for key examples), and to address these goals, individuals may adopt or strengthen certain political attitudes, or, alternatively, take or support certain lines of political action. For example, an anger reaction may lead the individual to support aggressive action that may preempt future attacks.

In other words, discrete emotions influence people’s political reactions to specific events by simple translation of the core emotional goals and action tendencies of the emotion into support for (or opposition to) practical policies that are seen as relevant reactions to the emotion-eliciting event. Accordingly, the same event would lead to support for different policies among different individuals who experienced different emotions in its wake. For example, if the dominant emotion would be group-based guilt, it could lead to support for policies aiming to correct the ingroup’s wrongdoings and/or compensate the outgroup (Čehajić, Effron, Halperin, Liberman, & Ross, 2011). If one is dominated by hope, she may be motivated to search for new avenues to change the future, probably by seriously considering new political information and creative political solutions (Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp, & Gross, 2014; Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Porat, & Bar-Tal, 2014). Conversely, if one

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**Figure 1.** The process model of reactive emotions and their influence in the context of intractable conflict.
is dominated by fear, most of her efforts would be devoted to the support of policies that would increase her feeling of security (Spanovic, Lickel, Denson, & Petrovic, 2010).

To elaborate on this process, let us begin with the example of anger, which is one of the most powerful and prevalent group-based emotions experienced in conflict situations (e.g., Halperin & Gross, 2011; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003). According to appraisal theories of emotions (e.g., Roseman 1984), anger stems from a perception of the outgroup’s actions as unjust and as deviating from acceptable norms. Accordingly, people experiencing anger believe that urgent action is needed to correct this wrongdoing, and the emotion is accompanied by a belief in the ingroup’s ability to initiate such corrective action (Mackie et al., 2000), commonly through confrontation (Berkowitz, 1993; Mackie et al., 2000) or violence (Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). On the other hand, this desire for corrective action may also lead to constructive action (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Halperin, Russell, Dweck, & Gross, 2011) and is not tied unequivocally to aggression. This is mainly due to the fact that anger, as a general approach emotion associated with a feeling of strength, can potentially lead to risk-seeking behavior, optimistic forecasting, and a true belief in the ingroup’s ability to favorably modify the situation, all of which are required for one to support dramatic steps towards peace.

Researchers have consistently demonstrated the strong motivating power of anger in the context of intergroup conflict, with most of this research focusing on anger’s association with increased support for aggressive policies and decreased support for conciliatory policies (e.g., Halperin, 2011; Huddy Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005; Lerner et al., 2003). For example, studies conducted in Northern Ireland and Spain have demonstrated that anger constitutes a significant emotional barrier in the face of potential compromises (Sabucedo, Durán, Alzate, & Rodríguez, 2011; Tam, Hewstone, Cairns, Tausch, Maio, & Kenworthy, 2007), and studies conducted in the United States after the 9/11 terrorist attacks found anger to be the most significant predictor of support for declaring war (Huddy et al., 2005; Lerner et al., 2003).

Nonetheless, the empirical literature also supports the notion that under certain circumstances anger may play a highly constructive role in peacemaking processes. For example, anger has been found to increase support for long-term reconciliation (Fischer & Roseman, 2007) and compromises (Halperin, 2011; Reifen-Tagar, Federico, & Halperin, 2011). Such favorable outcomes could arise from the experience of anger when the anger-inducing stimulus is followed by constructive and feasible modes of operation (Reifen-Tagar et al., 2011) and when it is not accompanied by long-term hatred (Halperin, Russell, Dweck, et al., 2011).

Hatred, on the other hand, is a more unequivocal intergroup emotion. In fact, it is one of the most powerful and extreme affective phenomena in the context of intergroup conflicts, directed at a particular group and denouncing it fundamentally and fully (Sternberg, 2003). Behaviorally, it is associated with the aspiration to not only confront the outgroup, but to initiate violence, harm the outgroup, and see its destruction (Halperin, 2008). Therefore, whereas anger involves an appraisal of an action as unjust and may therefore lead to either constructive or aggressive action, a core appraisal of hatred involves a view of the outgroup itself as evil by nature, possessing no ability to change (Halperin, 2008). Consequently, it cannot be associated with constructive action tendencies.

Several recent studies have demonstrated the destructive role played by hatred in the context of intergroup conflict. First is a recent study conducted in Israel (Halperin, 2011), examining the notion that hatred is the most dominant emotion in highly violent intergroup conflicts (e.g., Staub, 2005; Volkan, 1997). The study found that above and beyond any other emotion, hatred increased the tendency of Israelis to support extreme military action toward Palestinians. But the influence of hatred on intergroup conflicts goes beyond its role in such extreme events as war and violence. For example, recently we (Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009) tested the emotional processes that fuel political intolerance—the willingness to denounce the basic political rights of individuals who belong to a defined outgroup in a particular society (see Stouffer, 1955/1992). In
four large-scale nationwide surveys among Jews in Israel, we gauged their intolerance and found intergroup hatred to be the most important antecedent of this construct, especially in the context of threatening intergroup conflicts. Moreover, we demonstrated that other negative group-based emotions, like anger or fear, had no direct relation to political intolerance when taking hatred’s relation to intolerance into account in the model. The influence of hatred, however, does not depend on the existence of negative intergroup developments, and its deterministic nature makes it destructive even in the midst of peace negotiations.

Two recent studies found that individuals who experienced short-term episodes of hatred in times of negotiations in the Middle East expressed an emotional goal of harming and even eliminating the opponent (Halperin, 2008), opposed both the negotiations’ continuation and any conciliatory measures, and refused to even entertain new ideas that may lead to gestures or compromises towards peace (Halperin, 2011). Importantly, because hatred relates to the negation of the outgroup itself, rather than its actions, it is associated with opposition to all compromises, even symbolic ones. This clearly differentiates hatred from anger or fear, because their emotional goals may be served by conciliatory as well as aggressive actions, whereas the goals of hatred cannot be served by constructive action.

Fear is usually defined as an aversive emotion that arises in situations of perceived threat or danger to a person or to her group and its members. Like anger, fear may lead to different kinds of action tendencies, with both aggression (“fight”) and withdrawal (“flight”) commonly activated. These enable the person to respond adaptively to the threat (Gray, 1987). Even though it is usually activated and processed automatically, fear may also be the result of conscious appraisal of a situation. Often accompanied by a perception of relative weakness and low coping potential with regard to the threat (Roseman, 1984), fear in conflicts usually relates to personal and collective experiences determined by the nature of the conflict (e.g., war, terror attack, persecutions, economic depression, or imprisonment) and can even be induced by information received regarding potential threats to the individual or his group (e.g., Rachman, 1978).

Given fear’s inhibitory nature and the avoidance tendencies associated with it, it is only natural that most conflict resolution scholars see fear as an extremely powerful barrier to peace (e.g., Bar-Tal, 2001). Indeed, studies show that experiences of threat and fear increase conservatism, prejudice, ethnocentrism, and intolerance (e.g., Duckitt & Fisher, 2003). Other studies, in the framework of terror management theory, show that an existential threat leads to more right-wing inclinations and less compromising political tendencies (e.g., Hirschberger & Pyszczynski, 2010). More specific to the negotiation process itself, fear and collective angst lead to the strengthening of ingroup ties (Wohl, Branscombe, & Reysen, 2010), risk-aversive political tendencies, and concrete objection to negotiation (Sabucedo et al., 2011).

Nonetheless, because fear is associated with multiple action tendencies related to the emotional goal of decreasing levels of threat, it does not necessarily lead to a desire to harm the fear-inducing outgroup (Halperin, 2008). Indeed, a handful of recent studies have shown a positive association between intergroup fear, or the related emotion of angst, and the willingness to make compromises for peace (see Gayer, Tal, Halperin, & Bar-Tal, 2009; Halperin, Porat, & Wohl, 2013; Spanovic, Lickel, Denson, & Petrovic, 2010). In all of these studies, participants viewed compromises as the most efficient way to reduce threats and risks and therefore displayed more conciliatory positions in the face of fear. Nonetheless, whether it promotes conciliatory or aggressive attitudes, fear is consistently associated with closure and the avoidance of risk, and either type of attitude is guided by risk-avoidant action tendencies.

A more cognitively complex emotion than those described thus far, hope is an integrated reaction that consists of positive affect accompanied by expecting and planning a positive occurrence (Snyder, 2000). As a complex phenomenon, hope has not been associated with any specific physiological response leading to specific and concrete forms of behavior. Nonetheless, because hope
allows members of groups that are involved in violent conflicts to imagine a future that is different from the past, it also leads them to consider creative solutions to the disputes at the core of the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2001; Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp, et al., 2014). The belief that a peaceful resolution is possible, which is embedded within hope, is an essential step towards taking risks and compromising.

Recent years have brought with them empirical support for this notion. For example, a study conducted in Northern Ireland found that hope was positively related to the dissipation of the desire to retaliate, which, in turn, was positively related to the willingness to forgive the adversary (Moeschberger, Dixon, Niens, & Cairns, 2005). More importantly, there is now evidence that hope has a causal role in such processes, and induced hope has been found to lead to an increased willingness to support conciliatory action, including major compromises towards Israeli-Palestinian peace (Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp, et al., 2014). This is because hope requires setting goals, planning how to achieve them, the use of creativity and cognitive flexibility, and even risk taking (see Snyder, 2000), as well as a dynamic mindset (Cohen-Chen, Crisp, & Halperin, 2013). Across all of these examinations, hope emerges as a central engine for openness to, and the act of actively seeking, new information and ideas—an association that has recently been demonstrated empirically (Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Porat, et al., 2014).

Finally, empathy provides another slightly different example of an intergroup emotional phenomenon that may be present (or absent) in the context of intergroup conflict. Empathy is generally conceived of as an emotional process brought on by the comprehension of another’s affective state (Eisenberg, Shea, Carlo, & Knight, 1991), containing both cognitive and affective features (see Batson, 2009). The affective aspect of empathy (also called emotional empathy) refers to one’s vicarious emotional response to another person’s emotion or situation, i.e., feeling the way another feels, or having a congruent emotion because the other feels that way (see Hoffman, 1977). It is associated with a motivation to better others’ situation (Cikara, Bruneau, & Saxe, 2011) and thus predicts support for helpful outgroup-directed policies.

This prediction is supported by empirical examinations in the context of intergroup conflicts, which consistently show an association between empathy and constructive attitudes (e.g., Čehajić, Brown, & González, 2009; Tam et al. 2008). Moreover, several studies show that feelings of empathy can underpin the development of positive attitudes towards outgroups, whereas a lack of empathy is associated with negative effects on attitudes and behavior (Avenanti, Sirigu, & Aglioti, 2010). Empathy need not be aroused towards the group as a whole to have a positive effect for the intergroup context, and several studies have found that eliciting empathy for one outgroup member can generalize into more positive feelings and attitudes for the entire outgroup (e.g., Clore & Jeffery, 1972; Stephan & Finlay, 1999). More recent examinations have also shown that empathy can causally contribute to both support for constructive and humanitarian policies (Pliskin, Bar-Tal, Sheppes, & Halperin, 2014) and actual helping behavior (Mashuri, Hasanah & Rahmawati, 2013) in intergroup contexts. Generally, however, it seems that empathy specifically results in increased willingness to help the group, through actions such as humanitarian aid, and is not a general motivator for policy change or conciliatory measures (Rosler, Halperin, & Cohen-Chen, N.d.).

Looking at these five examples, it is clear that a negative-positive distinction among them is insufficient for explaining individual attitudes and behaviors in the context of intergroup conflict. Each emotion has its own unique “story” and thus its own unique ramifications. As we saw above, whereas anger is a highly motivating emotion that may lead to either destructive or constructive action tendencies, hatred unequivocally results in destructive attitudes or goals. Fear, contrary to both of these emotions, is an inhibiting emotion, leading to closure and risk avoidance—which may be indirectly achieved through either aggression or compromise. Hope, a positive emotion, leads to greater openness to new information and ideas and therefore to greater support for compromises and
changes required for ending an intergroup conflict. Empathy, on the other hand, is directed at the outgroup rather than the (political or social) situation and therefore leads to action tendencies serving a goal of helping the group, without directly affecting attitudes towards the ingroup or the situation itself. Understanding that each group-based emotion has a unique profile and a unique set of ramifications is highly important for understanding emotional dynamics in conflict but also for understanding how these various ramifications can be changed by tackling the emotions associated with them. The study of emotion regulation, described below, can make use of these understandings for the purpose of overcoming barriers to conflict resolution.

### Emotion Regulation in Intractable Conflicts

As demonstrated in the previous section, it is now well established that emotions (mostly intergroup emotions) play a central role in shaping people’s attitudes and behavior in conflict situations. This has led to an increased focus on emotions among political psychologists who study intergroup conflicts (e.g., Bar-Tal, 2001; Batson et al., 1997; Čehajić et al., 2009; Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp, et al., 2014; Halperin, 2008, 2011; Halperin & Gross, 2011; Huddy et al., 2005; Lerner et al., 2003; Mackie et al., 2000; Mashuri et al., 2013; Pliskin et al., 2014; Reifen-Tagar et al., 2011; Sabucedo et al., 2011; Spanovic et al., 2010; Stephan & Finlay, 1999; Sternberg, 2003; Tam et al., 2007, 2008; Volkan, 1997; Wohl et al., 2006, 2010). Nonetheless, even when political psychologists and conflict resolution scholars started taking emotions more seriously in their research, their dominant assumption regarding emotions was rather deterministic. They believed studying emotions could promote the understanding of political conflicts, yet they do little to promote their resolution. In our research in recent years (e.g., Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp, et al., 2014; Halperin, 2014; Halperin, Porat, Tamir, & Gross, 2013; Halperin, Pliskin, Saguy, Liberman, & Gross, 2014), we introduce a different approach, suggesting that strategies of emotion regulation, previously used in basic psychology, can be used in the context of intergroup conflicts and may potentially constitute a tool to promote conflict resolution. According to this approach, given the centrality of emotions in conflict and their far-reaching effects, emotion-based interventions may prove especially useful in these contexts.

This new approach is predicated on the idea that even powerful emotions can be modified. This insight is at the heart of a relatively new field of research in affective science that is concerned with emotion regulation, defined as the processes that influence which emotions we have, when we have them, and how we experience and express these emotions (Gross, 2007). Because emotions are multicomponential processes that unfold over time, emotion regulation may involve changes in various components of the emotional process, including the latency, rise time, magnitude, duration, or offset of responses in behavioral, experiential, or physiological domains (Gross & Thompson, 2007). Emotion regulation may increase or decrease the intensity and/or duration of either negative or positive emotions. Even though many emotional responses may in themselves involve some conscious or unconscious attempt by the responder to regulate them, emotion regulation is a unique emotional process in that it always serves a regulatory goal (Sheppes & Gross, 2011). A regulatory goal denotes a desire to influence the experienced emotion or its possible expressive or behavioral consequences and can be distinguished from the emotional goal associated with an emotion, which is not concerned with the emotion itself, but rather with the emotion-provoking stimulus and its relation to the self or group. While emotional reactions always involve emotional goals, they often arise in the absence of regulatory goals. According to the prominent process model of emotion regulation, there are five families of emotion regulation processes—situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment, cognitive change, and response modulation (Gross, 2007)—distinguished by the point in the emotion-generative process at which they have their primary impact (Gross & Thompson, 2007). While it is beyond the scope of the current review to address each of
these families and all the different strategies they contain, it is important to understand that methods for direct emotion regulation are varied and tackle a range of aspects of the emotional process. Recent studies in the field focusing on some of these strategies have shown that different strategies are implemented and lead to positive consequences under different contexts (e.g., Bonanno, Papa, Lalande, Westphal, & Coifman, 2004; Sheppes, Scheibe, Suri, & Gross, 2011). Cognitive change such as reappraisal, for example, refers to modifying the emotional appraisal while engaging with emotion-provoking stimuli in a way that alters its emotional impact (Gross, 2007). Reappraisal has been hailed as particularly important, with countless studies demonstrating the positive effects of teaching people to use the strategy on the experience and expression of emotion (See Gross, 2007, for a review) and even on aggression (Barlett & Anderson, 2011). However, because this strategy allows for extensive engagement with the stimulus, it may be less effective for emotion regulation under circumstances of high emotional intensity. In these cases, other emotion regulation strategies, such as attention deployment, may be more effective (Sheppes et al., 2011) because they tackle the emotion at an earlier point in its temporal development (Sheppes & Gross, 2011). Other than levels of engagement or effects, these and other emotion regulation strategies may differ in the amount of cognitive effort they demand, their appropriateness for different situations, and the different motivations associated with them (Sheppes et al., 2014).

Most of the research on emotion regulation has thus far focused on individuals or dyads. Additionally, research on emotion regulation has largely focused on direct forms of emotion regulation, by which people are given explicit strategies to modify aspects of their emotional experience. However, we argue that many of the insights from such research are applicable to the context of intergroup conflicts. Furthermore, we argue that because of motivational factors that may hinder the effectiveness of explicit strategies of direct emotion regulation, the study of emotion regulation in the context of intractable conflict must also consider methods of indirectly prompting the regulation of emotions. Both of these lines of research are discussed below.

Research into direct forms of emotion regulation has recently begun applying this construct to intergroup conflicts and the group-based emotions that emerge in their wake (Halperin & Gross, 2011; Halperin, Pliskin et al., 2014; Halperin, Porat, Tamir et al., 2013; Lee, Sohn, & Fowler, 2013). We obtained the first evidence linking reappraisal with conciliatory attitudes in the context of conflict in a correlational study conducted in the midst of the war in Gaza (Halperin & Gross, 2011). A nationwide survey of Jewish Israelis was sampled to test whether individual differences in the use of reappraisal were associated with political reactions during war. We found that Israelis who reported a greater tendency to use reappraisal were also more supportive of providing humanitarian aid to Palestinian citizens.

To address whether reappraisal played a causal role, we conducted a pair of studies in which we manipulated, rather than measured, cognitive reappraisal and estimated its effects on emotional reactions and political attitudes related to a long-term intergroup conflict (Halperin, Pliskin et al., 2014). Using the intrasocietal Israeli context, we examined whether reappraisal would decrease Jewish Israelis’ political intolerance towards various minorities in Israel. In Study 1, we presented Jewish-Israeli participants either neutral or reappraisal instructions (i.e., an instruction that they should read the following text from an external, analytical viewpoint) before they read a text inducing a range of negative emotions towards Palestinian Citizens of Israel (PCIs). We found that Israelis with a rightist political orientation (but not those with leftist orientation), which in Israel is linked with intolerance for PCIs, expressed lower levels of both negative emotions (averaged across the several negative emotions measured) and political intolerance towards PCIs after reading reappraisal (vs. neutral) instructions. Negative emotions mediated the effect of the reappraisal manipulation on levels of intolerance. Study 2 employed a similar methodology, but participants were asked to select their least-liked group in Israel and respond to stimuli and questions specifically addressing their outgroup of choice. This allowed us to test our hypothesis among all participants and not just
those with a right-wing ideology. Results were clear: we found lower levels of political intolerance among participants in the reappraisal condition compared to those in the control condition. This effect was again mediated by negative emotions.

These findings led us to wonder whether the effect of reappraisal would hold not only for an internal intergroup conflict, but also in the more extreme case of intractable conflict and outside the laboratory. To address this question, we presented a reappraisal manipulation, this time in the form of a reappraisal (vs. neutral) training session to Jewish-Israeli participants one week prior to a dramatic political event (the Palestinian United Nations bid in September 2011), and then measured emotional and political reactions one week and five months later (Halperin et al., 2013, Study 2). Although the reappraisal training session provided several general tools for reappraising one’s emotions that were not targeted at a specific emotion or at the context at hand, we found that participants trained to reappraise showed greater support for conciliatory rather than aggressive political policies towards Palestinians one week and five months posttraining, and that these effects were mediated by changes in anger.

However successful, the use of direct emotion regulation may pose challenges in its application outside the laboratory. Since most direct emotion regulation interventions take some time to learn and may require personal training, it would seem harder to broaden its scope to the societal level. An additional, related limitation is the fact that in order for people to utilize these methods spontaneously and continuously, they must be motivated to regulate their emotions in the first place (Tamir, 2009). Within the context of extreme and violent conflicts, in which people adhere to certain values and ideologies regarding the outgroup, it is doubtful that the majority of people would be internally motivated to transform their negative emotions towards the adversary outgroup. In order to overcome both of these obstacles, we recently started developing methods to transform emotions without providing people with direct instructions to do so in the form of indirect emotion regulation.

The indirect approach to emotion regulation involves, first and foremost, identifying the target action tendency associated with the desired conflict-related process (e.g., contact motivation, compromises, support for providing humanitarian aid etc.). Given the specificity of the emotion-action tendency association (Frijda, 1986), the next step would be connecting the target action tendency to a discrete emotion. For example, to motivate the conflicting parties into the negotiation room, a relevant target emotion for down-regulation would be fear, associated with withdrawal tendencies. If the goal is to increase support for providing humanitarian aid to the adversary outgroup, however, a more useful target emotion may be empathy. To successfully influence the selected emotion, the next step is to identify the emotion’s core appraisal theme (e.g., Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984), which constitutes the basis for its motivational and behavioral implications. By changing this core appraisal theme, the associated emotion can be regulated, leading to a transformation in emotional goals as well as action tendencies related to the conflict (See Figure 2). One such target action tendency may be, for example, an unwillingness to make any concessions to the adversary in a conflict, which may answer the destructive emotional goal associated with intergroup hatred. Once hatred is identified as the driving emotion, we can examine its core appraisal themes, finding a central one to be the belief that the outgroup’s evil nature is inherent and stable. Finding an intervention that may tackle this appraisal theme directly would complete the process illustrated in Figure 2.

![Figure 2. The steps to developing indirect emotion regulation interventions in intractable conflict.](image-url)
Indeed, several studies have demonstrated the great promise contained in this indirect approach to emotion regulation. Along the lines of the above example, we conducted a series of studies with the aim of reducing intergroup hatred and the destructive attitudinal outcomes of this emotion. In these studies, we (Halperin, Russell, Trzesniewski, Gross, & Dweck, 2011) began by identifying its core appraisal—namely, the perception of stable negative characteristics in the outgroup and the belief in the outgroup’s inability to undergo positive change (Halperin, 2008). We hypothesized that this appraisal is based on a more fundamental belief that groups in general hold some stable, innate characteristics that cannot change in a meaningful way. This belief has been described as an “entity” (or fixed) implicit theory about the malleability of groups, standing in opposition to an “incremental” (or malleable) view of groups’ nature (e.g., Rydell, Hugenberg, Ray, & Mackie, 2007).

Then, drawing on a growing body of literature suggesting that implicit beliefs about the malleability of groups (e.g., Rydell, Hugenberg, Ray, & Mackie, 2007) can be changed, we decided to examine whether an intervention designed to promote an incremental view of the malleability of groups would also lead to reduced hatred and increased support for compromises. Participants belonging to different groups living within an intractable conflict (i.e., Jewish Israelis, Palestinian citizens of Israel, and West Bank Palestinians) read an informative text indicating that research shows group in general can (versus cannot) change over time. Results showed that teaching people that groups have a malleable (vs. fixed) nature led them to express less hatred-related appraisals towards their respective outgroup, compared to those who learned that groups have fixed nature. This further led people to be more willing to make concessions at the core of the conflict. Thus, in all cases and for all groups the indirect implementation of the idea of the malleable nature of groups in general led to a transformation in the appraisal of the specific outgroup as fixed, decreasing hatred appraisals and increasing support for compromises required for peace (Halperin, Russell, Trzesniewski, et al., 2011).

While hatred is an emotion directed at the outgroup, other emotions are elicited by the individual’s relationship with the ingroup. One such emotion, which plays a crucial role in the resolution of conflicts and in post-conflict-reconciliation processes, is guilt. Guilt is an unpleasant emotion elicited when people’s behaviour deviates from what is perceived to be acceptable by moral standards and norms (Wohl & Branscombe, 2011). When the ingroup or its representatives have acted in a manner which is perceived to be morally unacceptable, and the individual believes that the harm was controlled and avoidable, the individual may experience group-based guilt (Wohl et al., 2006). Because it involves the acceptance of responsibility for harm committed by the ingroup (Branscombe, 2004), the experience of group-based guilt has been found to lead to support for reparations or compensation to the outgroup affected by this harm (e.g., Branscombe & Doosje, 2004). Here lies its importance in the context of resolving intergroup conflict, but the induction of guilt may be extremely hard to achieve because it threatens the group’s positive image (Halperin, Bar-Tal, Sharvit, Rosler, & Raviv, 2010; Wohl & Branscombe, 2011).

In order to address this obstacle and up-regulate group-based guilt, we (Čehajić et al., 2011) turned to self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988). This theory stipulates that people can tolerate a threat to a specific aspect of their identity if they are able to secure or affirm other aspects of their positive self-image, by, for example, focusing on an important source of pride (McQueen & Klein, 2006). Therefore, we hypothesized that given the opportunity to affirm their positive self-image, people would be freer to experience and express group-based guilt. Our rationale was that affirming a positive aspect of the self would enable people to accept responsibility for a wrongdoing while maintaining their (and their group’s) positive identity. In two studies (Čehajić et al., 2011) using Jewish-Israeli (Study 2) and Serbian (Study 3) participants, we examined whether a simple self-affirmation manipulation involving the recollection of a personal success would allow participants to acknowledge their group’s responsibility for harm inflicted on outgroup members, described in a text...
following the manipulation. Results in both studies showed that participants in the self-affirmation condition experienced more guilt and were also more willing to make reparations to the outgroup compared to those in the control condition.

As we mentioned before, research has also identified hope as an important conflict-related emotion that may be successfully regulated using an indirect approach. Given the defining characteristics of hope, it is not surprising that an ongoing, highly negative situation such as an intractable conflict might induce despair rather than hope (Stotland, 1969). Subsequently, those involved in conflict adopt a perception of the conflict as stable and unchanging, further feeding into its hopelessness in a cyclical manner (Coleman, Vallacher, Nowak, & Bui-Wrzosinska, 2007). Thus, in order to transform despair to hope, the belief that a different, better future of the conflict is impossible because conflicts are fixed must be changed to a belief in peace as a possibility because conflict situations are malleable. It follows that to indirectly up-regulate hope, one would need to alter people’s general beliefs about the malleability of conflicts, which could then be applied to the specific conflict by participants. Although implicit theories about groups were previously used to regulate emotions such as hatred, the core appraisal involved in hope focuses upon situations, not groups. Therefore, in order to change an appraisal which has to do with situations changing in the future, an indirect emotion regulation intervention must relate to the malleability of situations rather than groups.

Taking this into account, Cohen-Chen and colleagues (2014) conducted two studies among Jews in Israel to assess the possible relationship between the perceived malleability of conflicts and experienced hope. The first study examined this question correlationally and found incremental beliefs about conflicts (that is, beliefs that conflicts can change) to be positively associated with both hope and support for concessions, with the association between incremental beliefs and support for concessions mediated by experienced hope. The second study employed a similar experimental design to the one used above for hatred, only this time focusing on promoting the view of conflict situations as malleable. Results showed that those who learned that conflicts are malleable (versus those in the control condition) experienced higher levels of hope regarding the end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and consequently more willing to support concessions towards peace than those in the entity group (Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp, et al., 2014).

Finally, emergent literature expands the scope of previous work regarding hope. One such line of work (Cohen-Chen et al., 2013) indirectly regulated hope regarding conflict resolution by inducing a belief in a changing world (as opposed to unchanging), without referring to conflict situations in any way, as well as without necessarily implying the improvement of a given situation or the potential of the situation to change. Another set of studies (Saguy & Halperin, 2014) showed that exposure to internal criticism within the outgroup can increase hope regarding the future of the conflict. Israelis who heard a Palestinian criticizing the Palestinian society were more hopeful about future relations with Palestinians and were, as a consequence, more open to the outgroup’s perspective.

As demonstrated, research has provided much empirical support for the effectiveness of both direct and indirect approaches to emotion regulation in intergroup conflict. Interventions to regulate emotional experiences have, as hypothesized, been found not only to modify the emotional experience, but also to affect the downstream consequences of these experiences such as policy support. The studies reviewed and others along similar lines have demonstrated that because emotions are highly changeable yet highly potent psychological phenomena, tackling them provides a key to tackling the fundamental positions that shape the evolution of intergroup conflicts. Nevertheless, much work is still needed for these approaches to materialize into implementable interventions to improve intergroup relations or promote conflict resolution.

First, the study of emotion regulation in intergroup conflicts must identify and address the unique characteristics of group-based emotions and subsequently address how these unique
characteristics may influence attempts to regulate these emotions. This is especially relevant in the case of direct emotion regulation in conflict, as the research into this process has thus far simply taken regulation interventions as is from the personal level, with no adaptation to the group-based level. A second element missing from the research conducted thus far concerns people’s motivations. If people are not intrinsically motivated to change their emotions, interventions may prove less useful outside the lab. The indirect approach begins to address this by tackling appraisals rather than the emotions themselves, but much work is still needed to ensure emotion regulation interventions can be effective in the face of limited individual motivation. Finally, future research into these forms of emotion regulation must begin to consider the practical aspects of applying them to society members on a wider scale: How can such interventions reach enough people so as to have an impact on the societal level and consequently on the level of the conflict? Researchers must develop interventions bearing in mind the magnitude of the target audience, so as to consider modes of mass dissemination.

**Emotions in Context—Emotional Processes and the Unique Features of Intractable Conflict**

The findings presented thus far are promising in that they demonstrate how the adoption of previously accumulated knowledge about affective processes on the individual and group-based levels can further our understanding of the psychology of emotions in intergroup conflict and reconciliation. Nonetheless, as we have stated earlier in this article, it is important to remember that these emotional processes never exist in a vacuum. Every stage of the emotional process responds to the context in which the emotion arises and to the unique physical and sociopsychological features of this context. This is especially true in extreme situations such as intractable intergroup conflict, because of the many unique physical, social, and psychological realities present in them.

Why is it so important to consider the features of the context on both the societal and the individual level? As the literature on emotions indicates, a given context may influence the emotional process in at least four stages. First, an individual’s cognitive appraisals of an event are grounded in her social appraisals, ideology, previous experiences, and other elements related to the specific context (see Frijda, 1986). Second, the experience of the emotion itself can be intensified or dulled by the presence or absence of a corresponding collective experience (Goldenberg, Saguy, & Halperin, N.d.; Rimé, Finkenauer, Luminet, Zech, & Philippot, 1998). Third, the way an individual physically expresses (or suppresses) the emotion depends on the context in which the emotion is experienced. Finally, even in the face of stable emotional goals in response to the emotion experienced, one’s behavioral tendency may be radically influenced by the context, leading to possible opposite patterns of behavior. A fear situation, for example, may result in a wide range of different behaviors (e.g., vigilance, freezing, flight, attack) depending on the functional demands of that specific situation (Bouton, 2005). Therefore, when addressing the study of emotions and their regulation in the context of intractable conflict, it is important to move beyond the tendency to merely transplant one existing body of knowledge into another, more specific one and to ensure that the context is taken into account not only for the sake of understanding what stimuli may appear—but also how the stimuli may be perceived differently, processed differently, lead to different patterns of emotion, to different results in the face of emotion, and to different regulatory modes.

The collective context at hand, intractable conflict, is a prolonged context lasting for decades (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2013). This context influences society members by involving them, occupying a central position in public discourse, promoting the construction of an adaptable worldview, shaping behaviors, and imprinting every aspect of individual and collective life. Consequently, this context creates a unique set of psychological conditions such as enduring feelings of threat, danger, stress, and uncertainty (de Rivera & Paez, 2007). In their extreme form, these experiences may lead to trauma and to its clinical symptoms (e.g., Hobfoll, Canetti-Nisim, & Johnson, 2006). But even in
their least extreme forms, these conditions trigger perceptions, thoughts, ideas, and emotions that construct a highly dominant social identity coupled with collective memories and narratives that achieve a hegemonic status in society.

The psychological factors work together with the physical ones to construct the emotional reality of the people involved in intractable conflicts. These conflicts bring with them frequent high-intensity experiences, including major outbursts of violence, and thus offer nearly constant high-level emotional stimulation. This stimulation may affect the experience of future events in two competing ways. On the one hand, it may desensitize individuals in these contexts. On the other hand, the frequent arousal of certain action tendencies to address the emotional goals may turn them into automatic processes, and these reactions may therefore be particularly resistant to change in the face of new circumstances.

Taken together, these processes indicate that the individuals living in a society involved in conflict, by virtue of their involvement in the conflict, carry with them long-term factors that may shape the emotional process and its effects. These include long-term emotional sentiments; the societal beliefs mentioned above, formed together into a conflict-supporting ideology, often termed the Ethos of Conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013); and conflict-related trauma, which is another element absent in so-called normative contexts. We argue that these are three central features of the context that may influence the emotional process and its outcomes in several important ways (See Figure 3). First, each of these features may influence the emotion experienced—its type or its intensity. Second, each feature may influence the outcomes of the emotional process, leading people to greater or lesser likelihoods to act in the face of emotion or to different modes of action. Finally, each of these features may have an impact on processes related to emotion regulation, influencing individuals’ ability to regulate their emotion, their motivation to do so, and the way in which they chose to do so. We begin with an examination of the possible role played by emotional sentiments in these processes.

The Impact of Sentiments on Emotional Processes in Intractable Conflict

Emotion theorists have long suggested that an individual’s enduring emotional sentiments (Frijda, 1986) are an important antecedent to her emotional responses. Sentiments, which are

Figure 3. The influence of long-term factors (sentiments, ideology and trauma) on emotions, the results of emotion, and emotion regulation processes.
long-term predispositions to respond with particular emotions, are similar to emotions in that they are tied or connected to a specific person, object, event, or group. However, while *emotions* are short-term, multicomponential responses to specific events, *emotional sentiments* represent enduring configurations of these very same emotions (Arnold, 1960; Frijda, 1986). On this view, an emotional sentiment is a temporally stable, general emotional disposition towards a person, group, or symbol that is unrelated to any specific action or statement of this object (Halperin, 2011; Halperin & Gross, 2011). Apart from the sensory component, the sentimental chronic emotion has the same structure as does the immediate one. As such, long-term sentiments can take the form of any discrete emotions. We can think of people experiencing long-term feelings of fear of a specific group or event, of people feeling long-term despair regarding the feasibility of a particular negative situation changing (e.g., conflict or poverty) changing, or people experiencing long-term guilt for their unfair behavior that has not been forgiven after many years.

Sentiments are major players in the formation of individuals’ attitudes and behaviors in intractable conflicts. A central reason for this is the long-standing nature of these conflicts, allowing for the entrenchment of certain patterns of emotional reaction, gradually turning these reactions into enduring sentiments. Additionally, this long-term context includes an unvarying and stable object for these sentiments—the adversary. In other contexts, individuals may experience hatred frequently, but this emotion will often be directed at various targets, depending on the specific situation. The context of intractable conflict, however, provides a constant target for hatred or other intergroup emotions common to it. These attributes are accompanied by strong symbols present in various cultural products and situations, providing consistent reminders of these emotions even when no specific event or information is present to elicit them in the involved individuals. Finally, the context of intractable conflict is particularly rife with emotion compared to other societal contexts, providing the very initial foundation for the formation of long-term sentiments.

Sentiments are thought to be emotion-specific and not the result of a general predisposition to respond with negative affective responses. In other words, hatred sentiments should be associated with a lower threshold for hatred, but not necessarily for other negative emotions, such as fear or despair. However, not all emotions are equally susceptible to transforming into long-term sentiments. It would be reasonable to assume that certain emotions such as hatred or love, targeted at general objects, are more susceptible to transformation into sentiments, compared to event-targeted emotions (e.g., anger, humiliation). The emotions that more easily transform into sentiments are usually more cognitively based and as such are also often termed secondary (rather than primary) emotions.

Hope, for example, is a cognitively complex emotion that is targeted at an enduring situation (the conflict and its desired resolution). Therefore, a repeated emotional experience of hope should easily be transformed into an enduring and stable sentiment. Hatred is another classical example to consider in this regard, as it is both highly characteristic of intractable conflict and an emotion likely to also become a sentiment in this context. Given that haters see the outgroup as innately evil, hatred reactions are not limited to a short period of time, but rather constitute a standing evaluation targeted at the outgroup as long as it exists. Interestingly, in the last two decades, researchers (e.g., Sternberg, 2003; Halperin, 2008) have suggested that hatred can occur in both configurations—immediate and long-term. Finally, even fear, a highly automatic and physically salient emotion, can transform into a sentiment in the context of intractable conflicts, as the perception of threat in the environment is ongoing (Halperin, Sharvit, et al., 2011; Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2006).

These and other emotional sentiments both shape and are shaped by other elements in the psychological infrastructure characterizing individuals living in intractable conflict, such as the collective memory of conflict and the ethos of conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013). Collective memory is defined as representations of the past, remembered by society members as the history of the group and providing the epistemic foundation for the group’s existence and its continuity (Kansteiner, 2002). Ethos of Conflict is defined as “the configuration of central societal beliefs that provide dominant
characterization to the society and gives it a particular orientation” (Bar-Tal, 2000, p. xiv). The emotional sentiments, or emotional “stories” (Abelson & Prentice, 1989), serve as a glue, holding together the conflict-supporting beliefs contained in the collective memory and ethos (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011).

The sentiments also draw on the content of these beliefs, which translate into the appraisals forming people’s emotional reactions. For example, the constant belief which there is no peaceful “way-out,” coupled with repeated failures to resolve the conflict in practice, which are seen as confirming this belief, feeds directly into the pessimistic appraisals underlying the sentiment of despair. Similarly, the belief that the ingroup’s character is negative and subhuman (the Ethos theme of the adversary’s delegitimization, Bar-Tal, 2013) should feed into the sentiment of hatred, because a core appraisal of hatred is that any wrongdoing by the outgroup is intentional and related to the outgroup’s fundamental nature (Halperin, 2008). Finally, a central belief contained in the Ethos focuses on the group’s status as a victim throughout the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013). This belief feeds into the fear sentiment common to conflicts by continuously portraying the outgroup’s actions as harmful and threatening to the ingroup and framing all confrontations as aggression by the outgroup.

The above indicates that sentiments are central in intractable conflict, and because of their basic connection to emotions, they should also play a central role in shaping elements of the emotional process. The clearest role played by emotional sentiments in intractable conflicts is their influence on the emotions experienced by individuals in response to conflict-related stimuli such as confrontations or violent events (Halperin, 2011; Halperin & Gross, 2011). Based on an integration of classical appraisal theories of emotions (e.g., Roseman, 1984; Scherer et al., 2001) with the more recent appraisal tendency framework introduced by Lerner and Keltner (2000), this approach suggests that specific long-term sentiments bias the cognitive appraisals of specific events. This bias occurs because the sentiment activates a cognitive predisposition to interpret such events in a manner consistent with the sentiment’s core appraisals.

Initial support for this framework was found in our work on anger sentiments (Halperin & Gross, 2011). Using a unique two-wave nationwide representative panel design (n = 501) conducted among Israeli Jews during the 2009 war in Gaza, we found that the long-term sentiment of anger towards Palestinians (and not general negative affect) measured 13 months prior to the Gaza War, predicted participants’ anger responses towards the Palestinians during the war. Furthermore, we found that the effects of long-term anger sentiments were mediated by the participants’ current appraisals that the Palestinians’ behavior was unfair. Very similar results were found with regard to hatred and fear in a more recent study conducted in the same context (Halperin, 2011). While further research is still needed, these findings provided support for our model and can serve as a basis for further work along these lines.

Just as sentiments may influence the likelihood of experiencing an emotion or the extent to which it is experienced, they may also shape the outcomes of the emotion experienced. In other words, the presence or absence of a long-term emotional sentiment may determine whether or how an emotion experienced in light of conflict-related events is translated into behavior. For example, in a study we conducted looking at the outcomes of intergroup anger ahead of peace negotiations (Halperin, Russell, Dweck, et al., 2011), we hypothesized that the specific results of an anger induction would be contingent on the presence or absence of a long-term hatred sentiment. Because hatred, by its nature, leaves no opening for any constructive change, we believed someone with a strong hatred sentiment would not be able to consider constructive action as a viable means to correct the perceived wrongdoing behind the anger and would consequently support aggression. However, we proposed the opposite would be true in the absence of a hatred sentiment. We found this to be true across two studies within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The first showed that inducing Israeli-Jews’ anger toward Palestinians several weeks before the Annapolis peace summit
increased support for making compromises in the upcoming negotiations among those with low levels of hatred but decreased support for compromises among those with high levels of hatred. These findings were replicated in the next study, conducted just days before the summit.

Research along similar lines into other sentiments may reveal they also play a role in shaping the results of short-term emotions. For example, even though no research has been conducted to date about how the long-term sentiment of despair may moderate the relationship between emotions and their outcomes, we can hypothesize that its role may be decisive. In general, despair would be expected to decrease the motivating force associated with emotions such as anger or empathy. If one has a long-term despair sentiment, she may be reluctant to act to correct a perceived wrongdoing even if she experiences extreme anger. Similarly, experiencing empathy towards outgroup members held up daily in military checkpoints may motivate someone to help them by supporting the removal of these checkpoints, but only if he believes such support would not be futile. Fear sentiments may similarly impact the effects of short-term emotions. As fear motivates people to avoid uncertainty, they may be motivated to support whatever action would preserve the status quo. For example, it may be possible that the person experiencing empathy above would be motivated to support the removal of checkpoints, but only if he is not guided by a fear sentiment, as the removal of checkpoints leaves much room for uncertainty. In the presence of a fear sentiment, he may instead opt to support policies to ease conditions in checkpoints rather than remove them, as these do little to change the familiar status quo.

Finally, we believe sentiments should also influence processes related to the regulation of emotions in the context of intergroup conflict. Even though we know of no research examining this important question, there are several predictions that may stem from our theoretical knowledge on sentiments, emotions, and emotions regulation. The first relates to the effectiveness of emotion regulation. Generally speaking, regardless of the emotion-sentiment dyad at hand, emotions may be easier to regulate in the absence of a corresponding sentiment than in its presence. For example, the despair resulting from a disappointing development in the conflict should be easier for an individual to regulate if she does not hold a strong despair sentiment, automatically augmenting the appraisals associated with despair and helplessness. A more specific prediction would be that disengaging strategies of emotion regulation should be more effective than engaging strategies such as cognitive reappraisal for regulating emotions backed by corresponding sentiments. The reasoning behind this prediction is that the appraisals associated with the sentiment are so enduring and entrenched that they would leave little room for successful reappraisal of related events. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of disengagement strategies of emotion regulation could be short-lived, as it would address only the intermittent emotion, and not the related, long-lasting sentiment.

The Impact of Ideology on Emotional Processes in Intractable Conflict

As it is seen as a major factor influencing attitudes, action tendencies, and actual behavior, ideology has reemerged in recent years as a significant line of inquiry within the study of political psychology. Ideology can be defined as an organized construct of beliefs, attitudes, and values that provide a general worldview about a present and future reality (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; McClosky & Zaller, 1984). Such belief systems are highly important in the context of intergroup conflict, as they are widely disseminated and prevalent among society members. They are also highly relevant to emotional processes, as these processes are shaped by cognitive appraisals, which may relate directly to one’s long-term beliefs about reality.

Various examinations into ideological belief systems have provided evidence for a connection between the set of long-standing beliefs contained within an ideology and a variety of interpersonal and intergroup attitudes and outcomes (see Jost et al., 2009 for a review). But beyond ideological content, researchers have also identified the importance of the cognitive as well as underlying
psychological and motivational properties of ideology (Jost et al., 2009), which are universal to ideological belief systems around the world (Thorslundtir, Jost, Liviatan, & Shraft, 2007). According to this view, all ideologies can be described in terms of two dimensions that form their “discursive superstructure,” and these determine whether someone belongs to the political right (high acceptance of inequality and low openness to change) or political left (low acceptance of inequality and high openness to change) (Jost et al., 2009). Moreover, this approach claims that each edge of the ideological spectrum fulfills different relational, epistemic, and existential needs, such as the Need for Cognitive Closure (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003), and individuals tend to adopt ideologies more suited to their own dominant needs.

As it does in other distinct sociopolitical contexts, ideology takes on specific contents in the context of intractable conflict. Embodied in the Ethos of Conflict referenced above in the section on sentiments, this conflict-supporting ideology denotes a strong adherence to certain societal beliefs, such as the belief in the justness of the ingroup’s goals, the ingroup’s victimization throughout the conflict, and the outgroup’s inhumane and evil nature (Bar-Tal, 2013). Because of the centrality of the conflict in such societies, self-identification of individuals in conflict as rightists versus leftists is highly related to their level of adherence to the Ethos of Conflict, and empirical examinations have shown that the Ethos serves as the dominant ideology influencing the attitudes and political reactions of individual members of societies involved in intractable intergroup conflict (e.g., Bar-Tal, Raviv, Raviv, & Dgani-Hirsch, 2009; Bar-Tal, Sharvit, Zafran, & Halperin, 2012; Lavi, Canetti, Sharvit, Bar-Tal, & Hobfoll, 2014).

In addition to the ethos of conflict, it is possible to conceptualize ideology in the context of intractable conflict by examining its intensity or structure rather than its content. To this end, the literatures on moral conviction and sacred values are particularly useful. Moral conviction reflects the extent to which a person experiences a subjective evaluation of an attitude target in terms of fundamental right and wrong (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). In the context of intergroup conflict, moral conviction has been found to reduce trust in conflict resolution processes; reduce the facility and even likelihood of reaching agreement on conflict resolution processes with others who do not share one’s positions; and increase intolerance, prejudice, and social distance from attitudinally-dissimilar others (for a review, see Skitka, 2010). Like moral conviction, sacred values (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997) also refer to beliefs that are held with absolute fervor and viewed by a social group as so fundamentally entrenched in their identity that they are defended in the face of any emerging compromise. Because of the totality associated with intractable conflicts, sacred values figure centrally into them, and this role has been demonstrated empirically (e.g., Atran & Axelrod, 2008; Sheikh, Ginges, & Atran, 2013).

Like emotions, ideology has received much attention in the research community, but the research into these two constructs has been conducted separately for the most part. However, there have recently emerged several initial indications of ideology’s relationship with emotions. For one, several studies have found that disgust sensitivity is associated with the holding of rightist political attitudes (e.g., Helzer & Pizarro, 2011; Hodson & Costello, 2007). There are also indications that rightists have a greater tendency to experience fear than leftists, with longitudinal data revealing that individuals who displayed greater fear reaction as toddlers tend to hold ideologies that are more right-leaning in their adult years (Block & Block, 2006). Nonetheless, these indications remain preliminary and peripheral in their field, and it is important to consider ideology’s relationship with emotional processes more fully. Such consideration is even more important for those who study emotions or ideology within the context of intractable conflicts, given the centrality of these two psychological phenomena within these contexts. In fact, the connection between the two constructs is begging: the appraisals of emotions are related to and influenced by long-standing beliefs, and many of the epistemic and existential motives associated with ideology are conceptually related to certain emotions, or emotions in general.
Like sentiments, ideology may exert an influence on the emotional process in several different ways. First, in line with appraisal theories of emotions, ideological content should influence emotional reactions to new conflict-related occurrences by guiding people’s appraisals of these occurrences. Accordingly, two individuals holding different ideologies will respond differently to an emotion-eliciting event because they differently appraise that event. Empirical findings support this approach, with ideology leading to differences in emotional reactions, through the mediation of appraisal processes (Halperin & Gross, 2011; Halperin, Pliskin et al., 2014; Kahn, Liberman, Halperin, & Ross, in press). Similarly, adherence to beliefs of the Ethos of Conflict has been found to lead to varying levels of discrete emotions, such that higher adherence to the ethos leads to stronger fear, anger, and hatred experiences in response to information about Palestinian intentions (e.g., Halperin, 2011). A recent reanalysis of two large data files collected in Israel in recent years, published here for the first time, provides further support for these relationships between ideology, measured on either a right-to-left scale or using the Ethos scale, and discrete emotions. More specifically, rightist ideology and adherence to Ethos showed significant negative correlations with compassion and empathy and positive correlations with intergroup hatred, anger, and fear. Furthermore, when regressing all of these emotions on either ideology or Ethos, almost all remained significant predictors, indicating that each emotion is uniquely related to ideology, above and beyond the relationship between ideology and the other emotions. While these results are highly intuitive, they provide empirical support for the existing theoretical intuitions.

Moral conviction has also been tied theoretically and empirically to differences in the experience of emotion. Skitka and her colleagues (Mullen & Skitka, 2006; Skitka & Wisneski, 2011) posited that people might have stronger emotional associations with policy outcomes when they hold positions with strong rather than weak moral conviction, proposing that these emotional associations may help explain how moral convictions motivate individuals towards various political behaviors. Indeed, empirical work has demonstrated ties between moral conviction and anger (Mullen & Skitka, 2006) and also ties between morally convicted policy preferences and positive as well as negative emotions (Skitka & Wisneski, 2011), with emotions partially mediating the relationship between moral conviction and political behavior intentions.

Research we conducted addressing moral conviction and emotions in the specific context of intractable conflict (Reifen-Tagar, Morgan, Skitka, & Halperin, 2014) examined how both ideology and moral conviction were related to the experience of group-based emotions, namely anger and guilt. Jewish Israelis’ anger immediately after a war between Israelis and Palestinians was predicted by political ideology, such that rightists were angrier at the Palestinians than leftists. Guilt, however, was predicted by ideology only for those high on moral conviction, specifically, Israelis on the left and right differed in their levels of guilt substantially only when moral conviction was high.

A second key aspect of the potential relationship between ideology and emotions in conflict relates to possible differences between people of different ideologies in how they respond politically to experiencing similar emotions. When considering how ideology may moderate the relationship between discrete emotions and their outcomes, two emerging hypotheses emerge. It can intuitively be argued that, in a conflict, the conflict-supporting rightist ideology is more “hot-emotional” than “cold-cognitive,” and therefore the positions of rightists should be most guided by emotion, but there is little evidence in the literature to support this prediction. Conversely, research indicates that rightists’ positions change less than others’ positions under different circumstances: Ideological

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1 Data File 1 consisted of a representative sample of 501 Jewish Israelis (253 females and 248 males) who voluntarily participated in a phone survey conducted in Israel in October 2007, three weeks prior to the Annapolis Conference to relaunch peace negotiations. Data File 2 included a representative sample of Jewish Israelis who completed an online questionnaire distributed by the research firm Midgam Project (MP) in two waves: 808 participants responded in February 2012 (during a period of relative calm) and 402 (203 females and 199 males; ages ranging from 18 to 81, M = 45.65, SD = 15.4) responded again in November 2012 (during Israel’s one-week military operation in Gaza, a time of war).
rightists are consistently found to be more rigid in their beliefs, scoring higher than leftists on measures of tough-mindedness, dogmatism (Jost et al., 2009; Stone & Smith, 1993), and the Need for Cognitive Closure (Jost et al., 2009). Therefore, it can be hypothesized that leftists would be guided by their emotions more than rightists.

We recently tested this interesting question and found consistent support for the second hypothesis across six studies (Pliskin et al., 2014). In two experimental studies, induced empathy raised Jewish-Israeli leftists’, but not rightists’, support for conciliatory and humanitarian policies towards an adversarial outgroup (Palestinians) and even a nonadversarial outgroup (asylum-seekers), even though the manipulation affected people’s empathy regardless of their ideology. In a third experimental study, induced despair regarding the future of Israeli-Palestinian relations reduced leftist (but not rightist) Israelis’ support for gestures to the Palestinians. Then, three correlational field studies provided further support for our hypothesis, this time showing that both positive (empathy) and negative (anger and fear) emotional processes among Jewish and Palestinians citizens of Israel were related to leftists’, but not rightists’, support for policies in positive (peace negations) as well as highly negative (wartime, threatening government policies) conflict-related contexts (Pliskin et al., 2014). Similar trends were found when examining the effects of induced fear (Pliskin, Sheppes, & Halperin, N.d.).

The above findings support the hypothesis that leftists are guided by their emotions more than rightists in intractable conflict, but it remains to be seen whether this is true for all emotions and under all circumstances. A recent study examining the emotional content of campaign ads (Banks & Bell, 2013) indicates that ideology’s moderating power over the relationship between emotions and outcomes may not always be so clear cut. The researchers induced anger from an implicit racialized campaign ad and found that anger increased opposition to racial policies only among racial conservatives, i.e., rightists, leading instead to greater support for racial policies among liberals, i.e., leftists. This study indicates that in contexts unrelated to intractable conflict, the interactive influence of ideology and emotions on outcomes may be more complex than we initially hypothesized. Future research should further examine this question to illuminate the complex influence ideology has on the outcomes of emotions.

We also have initial evidence that moral conviction moderates the relationship between emotions and support for policies (Glik, Halperin, & Tamir, N.d.). In two correlational studies conducted among Jewish ideological rightists in Israel, participants responded to measures of moral conviction and sacred values, read an anger- (Study 1) or empathy-inducing text (Study 2), and then reported their levels of anger or empathy and their support for conflict-related policies. Results revealed that the more morally convicted participants were, or the more they adhered to sacred values, the more their willingness to support aggressive action was related to their anger. Interestingly, this pattern also held true for empathy—in this case an emotion somewhat at odds with the sacred values held by participants. Among participants who were morally convicted, there was a stronger relationship between empathy and support for conciliatory policies towards the Palestinians.

Finally, it is important to examine the influence of ideology on processes related to emotion regulation. No studies have been published specifically addressing the various facets of this relationship, but it is possible to hypothesize as to its nature, and there are a few initial unpublished empirical indications regarding it. First, it is possible to view ideology as a potent motivator to experience—and therefore regulate—emotions. Rightist ideology, for example, is associated with resistance to change, and therefore rightists may be motivated to feel anger in the face of attempts to change the status quo and therefore choose to up-regulate anger in reaction to such attempts. This is especially true in the context of intractable conflict, in which the conflict-supporting ideology sustains the conflict and guides the interpretation of new information. This ideology may thus motivate people adhering to it to up-regulate pride or down-regulate empathy towards the outgroup. Initial findings from an experimental study examining ideology as a possible motivation to up- or
down-regulate emotions provide support for this hypothesis. When Jewish Israelis were given a
distraction-based emotion regulation strategy before viewing an empathy-eliciting presentation
regarding an injured Palestinian, they either up- or down-regulated empathy (compared to a control
condition), depending on their ideology: Rightists’ empathy decreased, but leftists’ empathy
increased (Porat et al., N.d.).

Ideology may also serve to influence the effectiveness of various emotion regulation strategies—
both due to the motivation factor described above, but also because people of different ideologies
have differing cognitive and epistemic needs. Therefore, cognitive-change-based strategies of
emotion regulation may prove more effective for leftists as they tend to be higher on Need for
Cognition (Sargent, 2004). An alternative, opposite hypothesis might be that because leftists are
higher on the need for cognition, they tend to employ strategies for cognitive change automatically
(for evidence that leftists automatically “correct” their initial response, see Skitka, Mullen, Griffin,
Hutchinson, & Chamberlin, 2002) and therefore will be largely unaffected by an intervention
designed to promote the use of this strategy, with rightists affected more by such an intervention. The
literature above may also be relevant to attempts to speculate how people of different ideologies may
choose to regulate their emotions using different types of strategies. Leftists’ high need for cognition
may motivate them to choose strategies of cognitive engagement such as cognitive change over
disengagement strategies. Conversely, rightists would be motivated to avoid such strategies, because
of their high need for cognitive closure. These hypotheses remain to be examined.

The Impact of Repeated Exposure to Violence on Emotional Processes in Intractable Conflict

The conditions of intractable conflict involve repeated exposure to violence, often directly. In
extreme cases, such exposure can lead to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013), but even in the absence of such a clear clinical diagnosis, research
has shown repeated exposure to violence to have effects on psychological outcomes such as the
processing and learning of new information (e.g., Levy-Gigi & Richter-Levin, 2014). As stated
earlier, and due to the protracted violence that characterizes intractable conflict, acute trauma
disorders are highly prevalent in societies living is such conflicts (e.g., Canetti, Hall, Rapaport, &
Wayne, 2013; Muldoon & Lowe, 2012). This means that many of the clinical symptoms of PTSD
(including avoidant behavior, negative alterations in cognition or mood, and autonomic hyper-
arousal; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) are also highly prevalent in such societies, but
even beyond these, the repeated exposure to violence carries substantial psychological consequences
for all society members. In fact, Coleman’s classical conceptualization of intractable conflict already
referred to acute trauma as a characteristic of such realities (Coleman, 2000), and numerous accounts
of the harsh realities of intractable conflict have since identified the clinical consequences of
exposure to violence as a central element within societies involved in this reality (e.g., Bar-Tal,
Chernyak-Hai, Schori, & Gundar, 2009; Hamama-Raz, Solomon, Cohen, & Laufer, 2008; Muldoon
& Trew, 2000). We will therefore now elaborate on these clinical consequences and their significance
in conflict situations, before discussing how they may influence the experience of emotions, their
outcomes, and processes related to emotion regulation, in general and specifically within intractable
conflicts.

On the personal level, the repeated exposure to violence in the context of conflict can have grave
consequences, including heightened anxiety, a reduced sense of safety, the symptoms listed above,
and a subjective sense of insecurity (e.g., Canetti-Nisim, Halperin, Sharvit, & Hobfoll, 2009; Galea
et al., 2002; Lavi & Solomon, 2005). Recent studies have begun exploring the effects of such
traumatic exposure in conflict on threat perceptions and citizens’ resultant political positions
(Bonanno & Jost, 2006; Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009). However, this psychological distress also has
major effects on the collective level, as it is a motivator and entrencher of conflict-supporting beliefs
and also leads to aggressive, nonconciliatory intergroup attitudes (Canetti, Muldoon, Rapaport, Hirsch-Hoefler, & Lowe, 2011).

Relevant to the present discussion, trauma-related clinical symptomatology is significantly implicated in emotional process (e.g., Etkin & Wager, 2007; Litz & Gray, 2002). The nature of the resulting abnormalities in emotional processing, however, has been the source of conflicting theoretical and empirical accounts (Litz & Gray, 2002; Wolf, Miller, & McKinney, 2009). Indeed, some empirical findings indicate that repeated exposure to violence may lead to higher negative emotionality (Amdur, Larsen, & Liberzon, 2000; Wolf et al., 2009), whereas others document emotional numbing in individuals exposed to traumatic events (Glover, 1992; Litz & Gray, 2002; Wolf et al., 2009). Recent neuroimaging studies focusing on emotional areas of the brain such as the amygdala have provided support for the former explanation over the latter: Even those who report emotional numbing following repeated exposure to traumatic events tend to experience greater emotional intensity in response to negative stimuli (e.g., Etkin & Wager, 2007; Wolf et al., 2009).

Because of the above findings, it is important to understand how repeated exposure to violence might influence the experience of emotions in the context of intractable conflict. In such realities, not only are trauma-related clinical disorders prevalent, the trauma leading to them originates from events of the conflict, and such conflict-related events and information are omnipresent. Therefore, emotions are experienced by a significant portion of society members at very high levels—higher than the emotions traumaless individuals would have in response to identical stimuli. Furthermore, such individuals are more sensitive to negative-emotion inducing stimuli and specifically threatening stimuli, recognizing it much faster and more intuitively than healthy individuals. This hypersensitivity compounds the objective prevalence of conflict-related negative events, leading to an even greater experience of negative emotions, which may even be constant. Therefore, many individuals living in conflict may be constantly stimulated emotionally, and negatively so, shaping their world views, political positions, and concrete reactions to the events of the conflict.

Another interesting theoretical issue is how the clinical consequences of repeated exposure to violence might influence the outcomes of experienced emotions. In fact, it may be that the reason for the conflicting initial findings for the influence of trauma on emotion stem from such differences in the outcomes of emotion. Specifically, there are some indications that individuals exposed to traumatic events may be less expressive in the wake of experienced emotions, leading to the perception of emotional numbing. Litz and his colleagues found that even though participants who had undergone trauma responded with greater physical arousal than controls upon viewing emotion-inducing images, when they were primed with a reminder of their trauma, they expressed less emotion than the controls (Litz, Orsillo, Kaloupek, & Weathers, 2000). Presumably, these participants suppressed their emotional reactions, and thus it may be that the perceived numbing of emotion refers only to the expression of emotion, and not its experience. While the expression of emotions is part of the emotional process, and not an outcome of this process, differences in expression may be indicative of differences in emergent behaviors and may therefore provide relevant insight to our present discussion.

These indications may also be relevant when examining the outcomes of emotions in conflict. Individuals living in a conflict, who suffer clinical consequences of repeated exposure to violence, may be less willing or able to express their emotions. This may lead to two contradicting hypotheses: (1) such individuals may not be moved to act by their emotions—despite experiencing them strongly—and may maintain steady conflict-related positions and action tendencies even in the face of new emotion-inducing information; (2) such individuals may be overly influenced by their emotions because of their refusal to fully acknowledge them and because of the counterproductive effects of suppression as an emotion regulation strategy. Future research should attempt to determine how psycho-political outcomes in intractable conflict are shaped by the prevalence or absence of trauma-related clinical symptoms.
The above findings regarding the expression and suppression of emotions are also tied to the final element of the emotional process with which we have been concerned in this article: emotion regulation. In fact, suppression has received much attention in the literature on emotion regulation as a largely countereffective strategy to regulate emotional experiences (Gross, 2007). The research linking emotion regulation to the clinical consequences of exposure to violence, however, goes far beyond reference to suppression, and much research in the past few years has focused on emotion regulatory processes among individuals with trauma-related disorders (e.g., Benoit, Bouthillier, Moss, Rousseau, & Brunet, 2010; Tull, Barrett, McMillan, & Roemer, 2007). For example, many studies examining the relationship between PTSD and emotion regulation difficulties have found symptom severity to be associated with several hindering factors for successful regulation: lack of emotional acceptance, difficulty engaging in goal-directed behavior when upset, impulse-control difficulties, limited ability to employ effective emotion regulation strategies or to choose appropriate strategies to employ, and lack of emotional clarity (e.g., Cloitre, Miranda, Stovall-McClough, & Han, 2005; Ehring & Quack, 2010; Levy-Gigi, Richter-Levin, Shapiro, Kéri, & Sheppes, N.d.). Recently, supporting evidence has also been offered by a neuroimaging study (Etkin & Wager, 2007).

Because the clinical consequences of repeated exposure to violence play a decisive role in emotion regulation strategies rendering them significantly less effective, it is highly important to acknowledge the high prevalence of such clinical features in the context of intractable conflicts. Specifically, it follows that for many individuals living in societies in conflict, strategies of direct emotion regulation may not be effective in modifying emotional experiences and that such strategies should generally be less effective in such societies compared to societies living in nonviolent realities. It remains to be examined whether indirect methods of emotion regulation, focusing on the core cognitive appraisals of the emotion rather than on the emotion itself, would be more effective than direct strategies for individuals suffering from repeated exposure to violence. Such a finding would be important not only for the study of conflicts and their resolution, but potentially also for the creation of better treatments for trauma-related psychological disorders such as PTSD, promoting emotional coping by focusing on the cognitive rather than the affective features of the relevant emotions.

Summary and Conclusions: Main Challenges in Future Research and Practice

In the current article, we have provided a snapshot of a new approach to the understanding of intractable conflicts. This approach is based on four simple assumptions. First, and most importantly, emotions are powerful engines of human behavior, they are even more powerful in social contexts, and may be most powerful in the context of intractable conflicts. Second, emotions do not operate in a vacuum, and emotional processes in intractable conflicts should thus be studied differently than emotions in other domains in life. Third, each discrete group-based emotion has a unique nature, appraisals, emotional goals, and action tendencies, and as such each discrete group-based emotion leads to concrete political implications regarding conflict and conflict resolution dynamics. Finally, emotions can be changed (through emotion regulation processes), and in changing they can also affect change in political processes. Taken together, these assumptions, supported by some initial empirical findings presented throughout the article, can potentially offer conflict resolution scholars and practitioners a new direction in an attempt to address their goals. This new direction nicely corresponds with the affective revolution through which the social sciences more generally have gone. Consequently, it may be more openly accepted by leaders and laypeople alike, now that expressing, discussing, and even attempting to alter emotions has become more acceptable.

Nonetheless, although the study of emotions and emotion regulation in conflicts is incrementally developing, there is still a long way to go before the potential embedded within the integration of
these two fields can be fully utilized. One pivotal challenge on the way to achieving this goal is to knit together several communities of scholars, educating political scientists and conflict scholars about the potential contribution of the study of emotion and emotion regulation and educating emotion scholars about conflict studies (See Halperin [2014] for elaboration on this point). We believe that political psychologists can and should play an important role in addressing this challenge, as they can speak to the theoretical and methodological languages of these disparate communities. But this challenge is not an easy one. Among conflict resolution scholars, one can still identify general biases against the emotional approach, hesitance as to the actual ability to change people’s emotions in such long-term violent conflicts, and even some uncertainty about whether changing people’s emotions can in fact promote peace. Even more importantly, when political scientists do study emotions and their role in certain political processes, they do so in a relatively closed community and do not manage to reach out to emotion researchers for collaboration and the better dissemination of knowledge. Conversely, among emotion scholars, an apprehensive approach towards research conducted outside the laboratory and especially in the uncontrolled environments examined by conflict researchers is not uncommon. Such an approach prevents emotion researchers from utilizing the great potential embedded in their work to actually influence and help overcome urgent real-world problems. Nonetheless, even if these interdisciplinary gaps are bridged, scholars from both fields would face several important challenges, and we discuss these in the following section.

Theoretical, Empirical, and Applied Challenges in the Study of Emotions in Conflicts

As we have suggested earlier in this article, the most important challenge we see to the successful employment of an interdisciplinary approach to the study of emotions in conflict is going beyond the simple implementation of the known knowledge on emotions and emotion regulation into the realm of intractable conflicts. In this regard, researchers should take into account people’s individual and collective histories, their long-term emotions and ideologies, their individual and social motivations, the relative power of their society within the conflict (for a discussion of why power differentials may be of crucial importance to psychological processes in intractable conflicts, see Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto 2009; Saguy & Chernyak-Hai, 2012), and even the emotional climate and atmosphere of their respective societies (de Rivera, 1992). All these factors should influence the kinds of emotional processes we study, the way we study them, and the strategies we use to change them. The many variations in such factors also point to the importance of conducting comparative research, assessing and contrasting emotional processes that occur in different types of contexts and societies. We are currently making initial steps towards such comparative research, assessing the differing impact of emotional processes on collective action in societies either involved or uninvolved in intractable conflict, but the gaps in such comparative knowledge on the context-dependent role of emotional processes are vast and would benefit from future research along these lines. Understanding the varying influence of such factors, and specifically their unique influence within intractable conflicts, can potentially contribute both to the understanding of basic emotional processes and to expanding our toolkit of conflict resolution methods.

More specifically, this understanding coupled with the comparative view should lead us to look beyond the usual suspects in terms of the emotions studied. While numerous studies have examined the role of anger, fear (e.g., Huddy et al., 2005; Lerner et al., 2003; Skitka Bauman, Aramovich, & Morgan, 2006), and moral emotions (e.g., Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Čehajić et al., 2011) in conflict situations, empirical research studying the role of other emotions like despair, contempt, hatred, and humiliation, which might be even more relevant in the context of intractable conflicts, is less common and falls short of reflecting these emotions’ dominance in conflict zones. Undoubtedly,
emotional research into the nature and implications of some of these emotions in conflict situations can be challenging, but it is necessary for forming a comprehensive picture of the affective system involved in conflict situations.

The same principle of going beyond the most common and most studied emotions should be applied to the selection of the emotion regulation strategies studied. Even though most studies so far on emotion regulation in conflicts utilized cognitive reappraisal as the sole emotion regulation strategy, other emotion regulation strategies such as suppression or even situation selection might be relevant and should be studied in this context. On a related issue, future studies should seek to reveal not only the effective emotion regulation strategies that can potentially promote peace, but also the emotion regulation strategies (e.g., suppression) that help people ignore conflict-related events, consequently avoiding any tangible confrontation with the problems inherent in conflict situations. In many cases, these emotion regulation strategies serve as peace barriers rather than peace catalysts, and as such they should be studied with scrutiny.

From an emotion regulation perspective, another important direction for future research is to examine the integrated impact of emotion regulation strategies on the one hand and conflict-related motivations on the other hand on people’s emotional and political reactions to conflict-related events. Recent developments in psychology suggest that before people employ any regulation strategy, they must be motivated to engage in emotion regulation (Tamir, 2009; Tamir & Mauss, 2011). It is not unrealistic to suggest that in many conflict situations, people are not motivated to down-regulate negative intergroup emotions, and at times they even prefer to experience higher levels of these emotions. According to the instrumental approach to emotion regulation (e.g., Bonanno, 2001; Parrott, 1993; Tamir, 2009), people are motivated to experience emotions to the extent that these emotions offer instrumental benefits. In the context of intractable conflicts, the motivation to regulate (or not to regulate) emotions can be driven by ideological beliefs as well as by beliefs about potential costs and benefits of such regulation in terms of the ingroup’s position regarding the conflict and negotiation. We have recently started studying these motivations (e.g., Porat et al., N.d.), but future studies should delve more deeply into the process through which motivation to regulate emotions in conflict is shaped, as well as into the interrelations between ideology, motivation, regulation capabilities, and actual positions.

For conflict resolution scholars and practitioners, the “million-dollar question” is how to use the empirical knowledge to mobilize public opinion for peace or how to increase the scale and scope of the existing emotion regulation strategies. The simplest answer to these questions lies in the intersection between research and education, or in this case, peace education. Peace education programs should focus on more concrete messages, based on scientific knowledge about the implications of discrete emotions and the way to change them by altering their core appraisal themes (i.e., indirect emotion regulation). Simultaneously, other programs can teach efficient emotion regulation strategies (i.e., direct emotion regulation) and connect them to emotional experiences during conflict-related events. This can be suitable to situations in which explicit reference to promoting peace is unwelcome in the political and societal atmosphere, and more indirect strategies, in which the actual conflict is rarely mentioned, are therefore more feasible (see Bar-Tal & Rosen, 2009).

Finally, great potential for disseminating these ideas is embedded within media channels in general and the social media more specifically. Some efforts have been made in recent years to use media channels to reduce prejudice and promote peace (e.g., Paluck, 2009; Singhal, Cody, Rogers, & Sabido, 2004). New technological developments and the huge popularity of the new social media create a fertile ground for building new bridges that may help people regulate their negative emotions in the midst of long-term conflicts. Such regulation, as seen in the studies reviewed in this article, can help in forming more constructive reactions to conflict-related occurrences and potentially in promoting more conciliatory policies, with the aim of resolving the conflict.
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Emotional Processes Within a Unique Context


